A Case for Modal Fragmentalism
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A Case for Modal Fragmentalism Yiwen Zhan1 Received: 29 June 2020 / Revised: 7 October 2020 / Accepted: 19 October 2020 / © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract The idea of fragmentalism has been proposed by Kit Fine as a non-standard view of tense realism. This paper examines a modal version of the view, called modal fragmentalism, which combines genuine realism and realism of modality. Modal fragmentalism has been recently discussed by Iaquinto. But unlike Iaquinto, who primarily focused on possibilities de re, in this paper, we focus on expressions of possibilities de dicto. We argue that the chief idea of modal realism should be that different worlds are distinguished not just in terms of how things are differently with respect to each world, but also in terms of how things could have been differently with respect to each world. This demands a realism-oriented semantics for suppositional contents, and more specifically, for conditionals. By deploying a multidimensional semantics for conditionals, we show that there are good reasons to consider modal fragmentalism as a serious approach in metaphysics, which shares many similarities with the fragmentalism of tense. Keywords Fragmentalism · Modal realism · Conditionals · Counterfactuals · Contingency
1 Introduction In Fine (2005a), Kit Fine proposed a non-standard view of tense realism, which he dubbed fragmentalism. The view has been recently extended to general modality in Iaquinto (2020). In this paper, we will make a case for modal fragmentalism. The paper consists of two main parts. In the first part (Sections 2–3), we argue that for anyone who holds a genuine realist view on possible worlds (we will give precise definitions of those terms), fragmentalism is indeed a promising approach to pursue. But unlike Iaquinto (2020), which primarily focuses on de re possibilities, the center of our inquiry will be conditional expressions and de dicto possibilities. In the second Yiwen Zhan
[email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing, China
Philosophia
main part of the paper (Sections 4–8), we offer an analysis of conditionals, which we believe lends support for the realism of modality, and furthermore, for modal fragmentalism.
2 Problem of Possible-World Realism Our discussion starts with the genuine realism of possible worlds—it will serve as the basic assumption of the inquiry in this paper that possible worlds are genuine worlds. In other words, this paper will not provide any assessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of genuine realism compared to the other views on the market (above all, ersatzism and antirealism of possible worlds). Instead, our overall strategy is to provide a brief argument for the follows: First, assuming that possible worlds are genuinely real, then realism of modality is the more plausible alternative than antirealism of modality (i.e. if we adopt realism of worlds then we should also adopt realism of modality).1 Second, if you are already a genuine realist and a realist of modality, then th
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