A dilemma for evolutionary debunking arguments
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A dilemma for evolutionary debunking arguments Uri D. Leibowitz1
Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Evolutionary debunkers claim that evolutionary explanations of moral phenomena lead to sceptical conclusions. The aim of this paper is to show that even if we grant debunkers the speculative claims that evolution provides the best explanation of moral phenomena and that there are no other moral phenomena for which moral facts/properties are indispensable, the sceptical conclusions debunkers seek to establish still do not follow. The problem for debunkers is to link the empirical explanatory claim to the normative conclusion that moral beliefs are unjustified. The paper argues that debunkers face a dilemma, and that neither of the two options available to them supports the sceptical (normative) conclusions for which they aim. Consequently, it is claimed, the dialectical force of evolutionary debunking arguments is, at best, exceedingly weak. Keywords Evolution Scepticism Debunking Error theory
Over the past few years there has been a great deal of interest in the potential ‘debunking’ ramification of evolutionary theory for metaethics. Current interest in this topic is due, to a large extent, to influential works by Michael Ruse (1986), Richard Joyce (2001) and (2006) and Sharon Street (2006). Despite the differences between the views advanced by various ‘evolutionary debunkers’, one feature they all share is the thought that developments in evolutionary biology/psychology shed new light on traditional disputes about the metaphysics and epistemology of morality. & Uri D. Leibowitz [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
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U. Leibowitz
Debates on the nature of moral facts and the possibility of moral knowledge have been around at least since Plato. Many of the ‘‘moves’’ in these debates are, by now, well-known and the strengths and weaknesses of competing views are quite familiar. While further progress can, undoubtedly, be made by sifting through and finessing familiar arguments and by locating hitherto underexplored merits/demerits therein, a much more exciting alternative is to identify new evidence that had not yet been considered. Scientific developments are natural candidates for potential sources for evidence that might shed new light on these age-old debates and hence might deliver substantive novel results in metaethics. Current interest in, and excitement about, metaethical arguments that look to developments in evolutionary theory for insights are, therefore, understandable and laudable. Indeed, the quest for novel data to help adjudicate longstanding debates explains, I believe, the considerable interest in evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics despite the fact that the details of the empirical-evolutionary hypotheses on which they rely remain, at present, sketchy.1 In most cases, proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics do not flesh out the scientific-empirical explanations on which they rely. And even when
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