A MEA is a MEA is a MEA? Sequential decision making and the impact of different managed entry agreements at the manufact

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ORIGINAL PAPER

A MEA is a MEA is a MEA? Sequential decision making and the impact of different managed entry agreements at the manufacturer and payer level, using a case study for an oncology drug in England Nasuh C. Buyukkaramikli1   · Peter Wigfield2 · Men Thi Hoang3,4  Received: 5 February 2020 / Accepted: 12 August 2020 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2020

Abstract Background  In a typical single-payer setting that uses an explicit cost-effectiveness (CE) threshold in its decision-making, the payer aims to maximize the net-monetary-benefit (NMB) given the CE threshold, whilst the manufacturer aims to maximize the expected discounted-cash-flow (DCF) resulting from the sales of that technology. Managed entry agreements (MEAs) are tools that are used to improve access to expensive technologies that would otherwise not be deemed to be cost-effective to payers. While simple discount on the list price is the most commonly applied MEA type, there are different forms, each having a different impact on the cost-effectiveness of the technology, on the lifetime DCF-per-patient and on the decision uncertainty. We aim to analyze the sequential decision-making (SDM) of different MEAs (i.e. simple discount, free treatment initiation, lifetime treatment acquisition cost-capping [LTTACC], performance-based money-back guarantee [MBG]) at the manufacturer and at the payer level, respectively. Methods  We first model the SDM of the manufacturer and the payer as a sequential game and explain the challenges to find an equilibrium analytically. Then we propose a heuristic computational method to follow for each of the MEA types, based on practice. To demonstrate this SDM on a case study, a UK-based cost-utility analysis using a three-state, partitioned-survival-model was constructed to determine the cost-effectiveness of regorafenib versus best-supportive-care for the second-line treatment of hepatocellular carcinoma. The optimal agreement terms that would maximise the lifetime DCF-per-patient for each MEA, whilst remaining below the CE-threshold (£50,000/QALY gained) were obtained in the deterministic base-case. Robustness for each optimized MEA was then assessed using probabilistic sensitivity and scenario analyses, the value of information (VoI), and HTA-risk analyses. Results  As expected, the introduction of all MEAs improved the probabilistic ICER and NMB values to (almost) acceptable levels, compared to the “no-MEA” case (ICER ~ £78,000/QALY-gained). The expected DCFs across the explored MEAs were all similar, whilst the payer strategy & uncertainty burden (PSUB) for regorafenib decreased in all MEAs explored. VoI analyses revealed that regorafenib mean-dose-intensity and time-on-treatment (ToT) parameters attributed most to the decision uncertainty. LTTACC provided the smallest PSUB and the most robust NMB estimates under parametric uncertainty. For scenarios assuming increased regorafenib ToT or mean-dose-intensity, LTACC again provided acceptable cost-effectiveness outcomes, whereas for scenarios a