A Model for Partial Kantian Cooperation
In several game situations, the behavior of the players may depend not only on individual interests but also on what each player considers as the “correct thing to do.” This work presents a game-theoretic model, aiming to describe game situations in which
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David M. Ramsey Jérôme Renault Editors
Advances in Dynamic Games Games of Conflict, Evolutionary Games, Economic Games, and Games Involving Common Interest
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games Volume 17
Series Editor Tamer Başar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA Editorial Board Pierre Bernhard, University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis, France Maurizio Falcone, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy Jerzy Filar, University of Queensland, Australia Alain Haurie, ORDECSYS, Switzerland Andrzej S. Nowak, University of Zielona Góra, Poland Leon A. Petrosyan, St. Petersburg State University, Russia Alain Rapaport, INRIA, France
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/4919
David M. Ramsey Jérôme Renault •
Editors
Advances in Dynamic Games Games of Conflict, Evolutionary Games, Economic Games, and Games Involving Common Interest
Editors David M. Ramsey Faculty of Computer Science and Management Wrocław University of Science and Technology Wrocław, Poland
Jérôme Renault Toulouse School of Economics University Toulouse Capitole and ANITI Toulouse, France
ISSN 2474-0179 ISSN 2474-0187 (electronic) Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ISBN 978-3-030-56533-6 ISBN 978-3-030-56534-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56534-3 Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A25, 91A22, 91A23, 91A24, 91A26, 91A80 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This book is published under the imprint Birkhäuser, www.birkhauser-science.com by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
Game theory can be used to model the interaction between decision-makers in a wide range
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