A Multivariate Minimum Cost Consensus Model for Negotiations of Holdout Demolition
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A Multivariate Minimum Cost Consensus Model for Negotiations of Holdout Demolition Yong Liu1 · Ting Zhou1 · Jeffrey Yi‑Lin Forrest2
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Incidences of holdouts, as group events, have appeared most frequently in many countries. The underlying cause of these occurrences of high frequency has been closely related to multiple objectives or various conflicts of interest of stakehold‑ ers. Each negotiation of holdout demolition represents a typical group consensus problem with the outcome greatly influenced by multiple objectives or variables of the decision makers. In order to effectively deal with such difficult problems, we construct a multivariate, minimum cost consensus model based on interval num‑ ber programming constrained with random chances by jointly employing various approaches, such as minimum cost consensus model, multivariate planning, stochas‑ tic opportunity constrained programming and interval numbers. After the theoreti‑ cal development, this paper employs the established method to solve the problem of holdout demolition of particular town A. Keywords Holdout demolition · Negotiation · Group consensus · Minimum cost consensus · Multivariate
1 Introduction With the development of national economy, politics, culture, ecology and society, urbanization has shown an irreversible trend in China and other countries around the world. Urbanization involves the redistribution and reuse of land that involves a * Yong Liu [email protected] Ting Zhou [email protected] Jeffrey Yi‑Lin Forrest [email protected] 1
School of Business, Jiangnan University, Lihu Lake Road 1800, Wuxi City 214122, Jiangsu Province, China
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School of Business, Slippery Rock University, Slippery Rock, PA 16057, USA
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large amount of demolition. Each demolition inevitably involves the interests of all parties involved and group decision-making based on those interests. However, in the process of appealing to various interests, informational asymmetry and imbal‑ ance of power lead to frequent emergence of holdouts. The nail household problem is a complex group decision problem. Nail households and the government together constitute the DMs and moderator in the group decision process. They often need to carry out multiple rounds of negotiations and consume a lot of physical resources, such as time, manpower, and funds. Therefore, in order to simplify the problem, this paper abstracts the afore-mentioned physical resources into a single cost consump‑ tion. At the same time, considered includes that the nail households refused to move due to emotional, belief, and historical reasons, which led to failures of reaching any consensus. Therefore, these reasons are considered as variables that affect consen‑ sus, leading to the construction of a multivariate minimum cost consensus model. This paper tries to effectively unveil the “black box” of the consensus process of group decision making with minimal process loss and maximum benefit. Finally, th
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