A Tale of Two Deficits: Causality and Care in Medical AI

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A Tale of Two Deficits: Causality and Care in Medical AI Melvin Chen 1 Received: 27 September 2018 / Accepted: 14 May 2019/ # The Author(s) 2019, corrected publication 2019

Abstract In this paper, two central questions will be addressed: ought we to implement medical AI technology in the medical domain? If yes, how ought we to implement this technology? I will critically engage with three options that exist with respect to these central questions: the Neo-Luddite option, the Assistive option, and the Substitutive option. I will first address key objections on behalf of the Neo-Luddite option: the Objection from Bias, the Objection from Artificial Autonomy, the Objection from Status Quo, and the Objection from Inscrutability. I will thereafter present the Demographic Trends Argument and the Human Enhancement Argument in support of alternatives to the Neo-Luddite option. In the second half of the paper, I will argue against the Substitutive option and in favour of the Assistive option, given the existence of two chief formal deficits in medical AI technology: the causality deficit and the care deficit. Keywords Causality deficit . Care deficit . Health . Medical AI . Care robots . Care ethics .

Causal reasoning . Statistical reasoning . Assistive option . Substitutive option . NeoLuddite option . Value sensitive design . Capabilities approach . Artificial intelligence

1 Introduction Ought we to implement medical AI technology in the medical domain? If yes, how ought we to implement this technology? These are the two central questions that will be addressed in this paper. I will outline three options that exist with respect to the possible implementation of technology in the medical domain: the Neo-Luddite option Academic Profile: http://research.ntu.edu.sg/expertise/academicprofile/Pages/StaffProfile.aspx?ST_ EMAILID=MELVINCHEN&CategoryDescription=Philosophy

* Melvin Chen [email protected]

1

Nanyang Technological University, 26 Nanyang Avenue, Hall 8, Blk 44 #01-819, Singapore S639812, Singapore

M. Chen

(hereafter: NO), the Assistive option (hereafter: AO), and the Substitutive option (hereafter: SO). According to NO, one ought to uniformly resist the implementation of medical AI technology in the medical domain and (where possible) de-technologize our medical healthcare practices. According to AO, one ought to implement medical AI technology in the medical domain to assist our human medical healthcare professionals, without these professionals themselves being replaced. According to SO, one ought to implement medical AI technology, with a view to completely replacing our human medical healthcare professionals with fully automated technological alternatives in the long run. NO responds with a resounding ‘no’ to the first central question. AO and SO both respond in the affirmative to the first central question, although they differ in their responses to the second central question. I will present arguments against the NO, before demonstrating that the existence of at least two deficits—the ca