Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge
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Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge Susanne Mantel
Received: 29 February 2012 / Accepted: 16 August 2012 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
Abstract I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that acting for a normative reason is in many respects similar to knowledge. In order to strengthen Sosa’s account of knowledge, I propose to supplement it with an appeal to sub-competences. This clarifies how this account can deal with certain Gettier cases, and it helps to understand how exactly acting for a normative reason is similar to apt belief. Keywords Acting for reasons · Acting for a normative reason · Gettier problem · Knowledge · Apt belief · Normative reasons · Explanation · Competence · Virtue epistemology · Apt action 1 Introduction In this paper I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. These similarities are easiest to see when one first considers belief and action and then turns to knowledge and acting for a normative reason. Both beliefs and actions have standards of success: beliefs are assessable in terms of being true or false, and actions are assessable in terms of being favored or disfavored by normative reasons. With this structure in place, knowledge can be compared with acting for a normative reason. In both cases, a standard of success is
S. Mantel (B) Philosophisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, Geb. C 5.2, R. 218.1, 66123 Saarbrücken, Germany e-mail: [email protected]
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met: knowledge involves true belief and acting for a normative reason involves action that is favored by a normative reason. Furthermore, knowledge involves justification and some further component that guards against Gettier cases. On my view, acting for a normative reason involves a component that is analogous to justification and a further component that guards actions against being favored by a normative reason by mere luck, much like an anti-Gettier condition guards beliefs against being true by mere luck. The topic of this paper is part of the project to explore how theoretical and practical philosophy can learn from each other. I focus on an account of knowledge that is already part of this project, namely, Ernest Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology. Sosa draws on practical considerations in developing his account of knowledge. He applies some terms we use to talk about performances, such as ‘success’, ‘credit’, and ‘competence’, to the domain of belief. His analysis of knowledge as belief that is true because of competence relies on viewing belief as a performance. Accordingly, he describes and
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