Agent Causality
We act for reasons. But, it is sometimes claimed, the mental states and events that make up reasons, are not sufficient conditions of actions. Reasons never make actions happen. We- as agents (persons, selves, subjects) - make our actions happen. Actions
- PDF / 16,345,737 Bytes
- 173 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 101 Downloads / 198 Views
SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University
Editors: DIRK VAN DALEN, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands DONALD DAVIDSON, University of California, Berkeley THEO A.F. KUIPERS, University of Groningen, The Netherlands PATRICK SUPPES, Stanford University, California JAN WOLENSKI, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
VOLUME 283
FRED VOLLMER Department of Psychology, University of Bergen, Norway
AGENT CAUSALITY
'
~·
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-5272-8 ISBN 978-94-015-9225-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-9225-3
Printed an acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved © 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1999 Softcover reprlnt of the hardcover 1st edition 1999 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, incIuding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
CONTENTS
Preface
Vll
CHAPTER I. PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMON SENSE THEORY OF ACTION CHAPTER2. FRANKFURT'S SOLUTION
23
CHAPTER3. THEORIES OF AGENT CAUSALITY
25
CHAPTER4. PERSONS
42
CHAPTERS. REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
72
CHAPTER6. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
93
CHAPTER 7. THE BPI-PHENOMENALIST PROBLEM
103
CHAPTERS. IS THE SELF A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION?
115
CHAPTER9. DARKNESS, MADNESS AND CHILDHOOD
134
CHAPTER 10. OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
154
REFERENCES
157
NAME INDEX
165
SUBJECT INDEX
167
PREFACE We act for reasons. But, it is sometimes claimed, the mental states and events that make up reasons, are not sufficient conditions of actions. Reasons never make actions happen. We- as agents (persons, selves, subjects) - make our actions happen. Actions are done by us, not elicited by reasons. The present essay is an attempt to understand this concept of agent causality. Who -~ or what - is an agent ? And how - in virtue of what - does an agent do things, or refrain from doing them? The first chapter deals with problems in the theory of action that seem to require the assumption that actions are controlled by agents. Chapters two and three then review and discuss theories of agent causality. Chapters four and five make up the central parts of the essay in which my own solution is put forth, and chapter six presents some data that seem to support this view. Chapter seven discusses how the theory can be reconciled with neuro-physiological facts. And in the last two chapters the theory is confronted with conflicting viewpoints and phenomena. Daniel Robinson and Richard Swinburne took time to read parts of the manuscript in draft form. Though they disagree with my main viewpoints on the nature of the self, their conunents were very helpful. I hereby thank them both. Parts of chapters five and six use mat
Data Loading...
