An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds
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An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds Reuben Sass1 Received: 20 January 2020 / Accepted: 17 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract This paper defends an ontology of weak entity realism for homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theories of natural kinds, adapted from Bird’s (Synthese 195(4):1397–1426, 2018) taxonomy of such theories. Weak entity realism about HPC kinds accepts the existence of natural kinds. Weak entity realism denies two theses: that (1) HPC kinds have mind-independent essences, and that (2) HPC kinds reduce to entities, such as complex universals, posited only by metaphysical theories. Strong entity realism accepts (1) and (2), whereas moderate entity realism accepts only (1). Given its commitment to (2), strong entity realism is more theoretically complex than weak entity realism, with little explanatory payoff. Given their commitment to (1), moderate and strong entity realisms cannot explain how the identity conditions of HPC kinds are to be straightforwardly knowable. I argue that weak entity realism avoids such epistemic difficulties. I further rebut two plausible criticisms of weak entity realism, namely that weak entity realism cannot account for quantification over kinds, and that weak entity realism cannot provide identity conditions for HPC kinds which are both scientifically useful and objective. Given the theoretical costs of strong and moderate entity realism, and weak entity realism’s adequate response to its most plausible challenges, weak entity realism about HPCs is to be preferred, especially for biological and chemical kinds. Keywords Ontology · Realism · Anti-realism · Homeostatic property cluster · Essence · Natural kinds
1 A taxonomy of views about natural kinds There are a variety of positions available concerning the nature and existence of natural kinds. The main axis along which the contemporary debate turns is that of realism versus anti-realism (Hacking 1991; Hawley and Bird 2011; Franklin-Hall
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Reuben Sass [email protected] Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
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Synthese
2015; Bird 2018). Several distinct questions, however, may easily be conflated under the realist/anti-realist distinction. The question of whether kinds exist can be conflated with the question of how kinds are individuated, and with the question of what kinds are. In light of such questions, several taxonomies have recently been proposed to distinguish realism and anti-realism about natural kinds. Such taxonomies aim to spell out how the philosophical commitments of realists about kinds differ from those of anti-realists. The goal is to have a consistent and informative test for what counts as a realist versus an anti-realist view about natural kinds. Bird’s (2018) taxonomy, building on Hawley and Bird (2011), focuses on the questions of whether natural kinds exist, and if so, what sort of entity kinds are. Franklin-Hall’s (2015) taxonomy focuses instead on whether kinds are individuated by a mind-independent principle, or whether kinds “carve at the joints”.1 This paper
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