Another Look at Mode Intentionalism
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Another Look at Mode Intentionalism Jonathan Mitchell1 Received: 8 November 2019 / Accepted: 18 August 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. This paper considers an alternative called Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. I assess a phenomenal contrast argument in support of this view, arguing that the cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience. Intentionalist views in the philosophy of mind come in several varieties. However, all such views are concerned with the question of what it is about experience that determines what-it-is-like. In other words, Intentionalist views of all stripes provide an answer to the question of what properties or features of experience determine its phenomenal character. It is principally in the details of their answers to this question that varieties of Intentionalism differ. This paper considers a phenomenal contrast argument for the view that two things determine the phenomenal character of intentional experience, namely intentional content and intentional mode. I call this view Mode Intentionalism. My central claim is that this argument is unsuccessful. The cases discussed are sense-perceptual experiences. Part of the motivation for this restriction is that they are paradigm intentional experiences, as personal level mental states which (relatively) non-controversially exhibit both intentionality and phenomenal character. So, if we want to understand the relation between the intentional and the phenomenal, then sense-perceptual experiences are an excellent place to start. Given this, I don’t consider how the claims that follow map onto intentional experience per se. Let me note, however, this restriction means I won’t be considering arguments on behalf of Mode Intentionalism which draw on putatively non-content based phenomenal contrasts among cognitive intentional experiences. These could be contrasts * Jonathan Mitchell [email protected] 1
University of Manchester, 24 Oaks Road, Kenilworth, Warwickshire CV8 1GE, UK
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between (1) conscious thoughts (e.g. judging that P vs wondering that P); (2) conscious thoughts and imaginations (e.g. consciously thinking that the Eiffel Tower has a certain colour vs imagining that it does); or (3) across imaginative states. Although I do consider a contrast between sense-perception and imagistic memory. Important works in the literature seek to motivate views approximating to Mode Intentionalism in such ways.1 A comprehensive case against Mode Intentionalism would, therefore, deal with such cases. The more limited conclusion offered in this paper is that the arguments considered do not sufficiently motivate Mode Intentionalism a
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