Argumentative Adversariality, Contrastive Reasons, and the Winners-and-Losers Problem
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Argumentative Adversariality, Contrastive Reasons, and the Winners‑and‑Losers Problem Scott Aikin1 Accepted: 6 September 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract This essay has two connected theses. First, that given the contrastivity of reasons, a form of dialectical adversariality of argument follows. This dialectical adversariality accounts for a broad variety of both argumentative virtues and vices. Second, in light of this contrastivist view of reasons, the primary objection to argumentative adversarialism, the winners-and-losers problem, can be answered. Keywords Argumentation · Adversariality · Collaboration · Cooperation · Contrastivism
1 A Biased Lay of the Land The adversariality of argument debate has two main axes.1 The first is that of identifying the potential that adversariality in argument has for producing inappropriate argumentative performance. Call this the practical domain of the adversariality question. In the practical domain, there are those who hold that all adversarial argument is inappropriate, those who hold that some is inappropriate, then those who hold that some is inappropriate and some is in fact salutary. No one in the discussion, to my knowledge, holds that all adversarial argument is salutary.2 Anyone who has complained that the combative comportment of some discussant stifles exchange or who has wondered whether the desire to defend one’s view at all costs perverts the ends of critical discussion can feel the pull of this issue. As can anyone who has seen that the exchange of critical reasons on our deeply held views deepens our understanding and may be a requirement of sharing a polity with those with whom we disagree. Further, anyone who has seen that dissent and expressions of outrage are important argumentative gestures can see the stakes for this discussion. The second axis of critical discussion is about whether argument must be adversarial. Is adversariality essential * Scott Aikin [email protected] 1
Philosophy Department, Vanderbilt University, PMB 406319, 2301 Vanderbilt Place, Nashville, TN 37240‑6319, USA
to argument, or could argument be otherwise? With the question of essential adversariality, there are the intrinsic adversarialists, who hold that argument is adversarial at its core. The rejection of intrinsicism comes in two strengths, modest and strong. The modest rejection of intrinsicism is that argument is not essentially adversarial. The strong rejection of intrinsicism is that argument is essentially not adversarial.3 Considerations in favor of intrinsicism are that argument’s primary felicity condition is disagreement and that others’ arguments are impingements on one’s beliefs. Considerations in favor of weak non-intrinsicism are that, for as often as there are argumentative adversaries, there 1
See Aikin and Alsip Vollbrecht (2020) for an overview of the divisions and motivations for the sides in the debate and its connection to other ethical considerations bearing on argument. Others who make the distinction along similar lines ar
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