Automated Methods in Cryptographic Fault Analysis
This book presents a collection of automated methods that are useful for different aspects of fault analysis in cryptography. The first part focuses on automated analysis of symmetric cipher design specifications, software implementations, and hardware ci
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mated Methods in Cryptographic Fault Analysis
Automated Methods in Cryptographic Fault Analysis
Jakub Breier • Xiaolu Hou • Shivam Bhasin Editors
Automated Methods in Cryptographic Fault Analysis Foreword by Joan Daemen – Co-Designer of AES & SHA-3
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Editors Jakub Breier Underwriters Laboratories Singapore, Singapore
Xiaolu Hou Acronis Singapore, Singapore
Shivam Bhasin Temasek Laboratories Nanyang Technological University Singapore, Singapore
ISBN 978-3-030-11332-2 ISBN 978-3-030-11333-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11333-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019933913 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
The greatest of all faults is to be conscious of none. –Thomas Carlyle
Foreword
Building cryptographic schemes that offer resistance against determined adversaries has never been easy, and the number of failed attempts largely outweighs the successful ones. However, thanks to open research, we have seen huge progress in the last 50 years. In particular, at conceptual and mathematical level, we are able to build complex cryptosystems that offer security with high assurance against adversaries that have only access to the system’s input and output and not its secret or private keys. This picture becomes somewhat less rosy if the adversary can get access to side-channel information such as the power consumption or electromagnetic emanations of the—ultimately physical—devices performing the actual cryptographic computations. It becomes outright worrisome if an adversary can disturb these devices, e.g., through the power supply, ambient temperature, radiation, etc., to cause it to make faults. We are witnessing the tr
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