Binding Cryptographic Keys into Biometric Data: Optimization

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Binding Cryptographic Keys into Biometric Data: Optimization E. T. Zainulinaa,* and I. A. Matveevb,** a

b Federal

Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), Dolgoprudnyi, Moscow Region, Russia Research Center “Computer Science and Control,” Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Moscow, Russia *e-mail: [email protected] **e-mail: [email protected] Received April 6, 2020; revised April 20, 2020; accepted May 25, 2020

Abstract—Cryptography and biometry are important components of contemporary access control systems. Cryptographic systems themselves are highly reliable but they require the exact reproduction of access keys; this cannot be done by humans, while the corresponding devices might be lost or stolen. Biometric data are always with the person; however, they vary: it is impossible to obtain the same feature values. In this paper, a way is proposed to link the cryptographic key and the biometric features of the iris. This yields a two-component key such that no original component can be extracted until the biometric features close to the original ones, i.e., the data of the same person, are presented. The connecting method (coder) and the extracting method (decoder) consist of several separate steps executed successively. To select the parameters, we solve the following discrete optimization problem: under the given threshold of the false accept rate, we minimize the value of the false reject rate. The restrictions of this optimization problem are the minimal size of the coded key and the maximal size of the final key. Numerical experiments are conducted on open-access databases (DBs). DOI: 10.1134/S1064230720050135

INTRODUCTION Nowadays, data protection based on cryptographic algorithms is applied everywhere. Many such algorithms and ways of applying them have been devised (see [1]). Here, we restrict ourselves to the case of symmetric ciphering, i.e., by the following procedure. At the coding stage, from the message M and the secret key K, the code C = Φ(M , K ) is computed by the coder function Φ ; at the decoding stage, the decoder function Ψ restores the message: M = Ψ(C , K ). It is impossible to obtain M from code C without key K. That is why C is open (not secret). The symmetric property of the ciphering is as follows: the used key K is to be reproduced absolutely exactly. For example, in the case of a binary sequence, all its bits must coincide. In this case, there is an acute problem: such keys are easily alienated (forwarded, stolen, or lost). Another actual problem is the weak ability of humans to remember password sequences. A person can remember and reproduce a password invented by themselves (although difficulties arise even in this case) but cannot remember an automatically generated sequence of several dozens of pseudorandom characters (see [2]). At the same time, each human possesses biometric features, which are easily extracted, are hard to lose, and have substantial information volume. This refers primarily to the iris (see [3]) and to a lesser ex