Categorization in Intentional Theory of Concepts
The recent rapid growth of empirical results in neuroscience has widened a proverbial explanatory gap between a first-person introspective experience and objective third-person data. Given different competing approaches, phenomenological framework proved
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Department of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia [email protected] 2 Russian Foreign Trade Academy, Moscow, Russia [email protected]
Abstract. The recent rapid growth of empirical results in neuroscience has widened a proverbial explanatory gap between a first-person introspective experience and objective third-person data. Given different competing approaches, phenomenological framework proved an adequate methodological tool to bridge this gap. The present paper aims at a phenomenological representation of categorization by means of a modified functional theory of concept, termed Intentional Theory of Concept. The 1st section hereof serves as an introduction into the subject matter. In the 2nd section, we will focus on key phenomenological ideas of intentionality and analogous apperception (appresentation) and briefly describe our approach. The 3rd section contains a short summary of the modern version of the classical theory of concepts and its functional variant. Integrating the substance of the previous sections, the 4th one will offer an interpretation of categorization by means of a functional theory of concepts formally presented by typed lambda calculus. The final section provides a summary of findings and prospects for a follow-up study. Keywords: Phenomenology · Analogous apperception tion · Theory of concepts · Lambda calculus
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Categoriza-
Introduction
This paper contributes to a new approach to an examination of cognitive activity from a phenomenological perspective. More specifically, we will zero on the operation of categorization and introduce its novel interpretation in terms of the modernized theory of concepts. One of the most important challenges is the venerable mind-body problem and in particular its modern reincarnation the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ coined by David Chalmers. Very briefly, it can be explicated as the problem of explaining how individual experiences are possible, why and how we experience anything. These phenomenal aspects of our mental life, which can be accepted only introspectively, are instantiated by intrinsic qualities known as qualia. Contrary to popular belief, the hard problem of consciousness appeared to be not a whim of a beautiful scholastic mind but a very specific task, which can be c Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 L. Cheng et al. (Eds.): ISNN 2016, LNCS 9719, pp. 465–473, 2016. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40663-3 53
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D. Zaitsev and N. Zaitseva
articulated as finding how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience? However, conrming the status of a true perpetual problem, many attempts to solve it met serious embarrassment of the so-called ’explanatory gap’. “For no matter how deeply we probe into the physical structure of neurons and the chemical transactions which occur when they fire, no matter how much objective information we come to acquire, we still seem to be left with something that we cannot explain, namely, why and how such-andsuch objective, physical changes, whatever they m
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