Certificate Revocation in Hybrid Ad Hoc Network
In this work, we study the certification revocation scheme in a hybrid ad hoc network. In VANET, a vehicle sends out erroneous messages, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to other vehicles of the VANET which should ignore such messages to protect
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1 Introduction Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a hybrid ad hoc network. The main aim of VANET is to help a group of vehicles to establish a communication network among them without support by any fixed infrastructure [1]. Similarly, vehicles can also communicate with fixed infrastructure roadside units (RSU ). There are two types of communication: vehicle to infrastructure (V 2I ) or infrastructure to vehicle (I 2V ) and vehicle to vehicle (V 2V ) in broadcast and peer-to-peer modes. Vehicles are equipped with the on-board unit (O BU ), global positioning system (G P S), microsensors, etc. [2]. Transmission ranges of a vehicle and RSU are 100–300 m and 500–1000 m, respectively [2]. Vehicles share road conditions, safety messages, location-based services, etc. VANET has hundreds of millions of vehicles distributed on the road. It is densely deployed and characterized by a highly dynamic topology with vehicles moving on the roads/highways [3]. A vehicle sends out erroneous messages along with certificates, whether intentionally or unintentionally; other vehicles of the VANET should ignore such messages to protect its safety. However, public-key cryptography (P K C) is used for authentication to protect attackers from causing evils. A certificate is a proof that a public key belongs to a certain vehicle and used as a proof of identity. In general, certificates have a time period for which they are valid, defined by a start time and an end time (lifetime), identity of issuer and sender, etc. [4]. The trusted third party or certificate authority (CA) may create a certificate
A. Chaturvedi · B. K. Chaurasia (B) ITM University Gwalior, Gwalior, India e-mail: [email protected] A. Chaturvedi e-mail: [email protected] A. Chaturvedi · B. K. Chaurasia Indian Institute of Information Technology, Lucknow, India © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 R. K. Shukla et al. (eds.), Data, Engineering and Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6351-1_8
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upon a request from an individual user. The size of the certificate can be either 64 or 80 bits according to IEEE 1609.2 after using SHA-256 [5, 6]. Certificate revocation list (CRL) is the most common approach for certificate revocation. In the PKI-based approach [7], each message from a vehicle is signed using its private key, and the certificate received from a trusted authority (C A) is also attached with the message. To reduce the overhead, the elliptic curve cryptography is used. However, it is recommended that only critical messages should be signed by a vehicle. Three mechanisms are proposed for compromised certification revocation. The first approach is revocation using compressed certificate revocation lists (RC 2 R L), distributed to vehicles with information on revoked certificates using Bloom filters. The second approach is revocation of the tamper-proof device (RT D P); the trusted third party or C A encrypts a revocation message by vehicle’s public key and sends it to the subsequent vehicle which the
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