Chimpanzee normativity: evidence and objections
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Chimpanzee normativity: evidence and objections Simon Fitzpatrick1 Received: 27 September 2019 / Accepted: 27 July 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract This paper considers the question of whether chimpanzees possess at least a primitive sense of normativity: i.e., some ability to internalize and enforce social norms— rules governing appropriate and inappropriate behaviour—within their social groups, and to make evaluations of others’ behaviour in light of such norms. A number of scientists and philosophers have argued that such a sense of normativity does exist in chimpanzees and in several other non-human primate and mammalian species. However, the dominant view in the scientific and philosophical literature is that psychological capacities for social norms evolved uniquely in the human lineage, after our last common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos. After reviewing some of the existing evidence for normative capacity in chimpanzees, I defend the thesis of chimpanzee normativity against three key theoretical objections that have been presented in the literature, each of which have played a part in motivating the dominant sceptical position. I argue that, while we still have much to learn about the nature and extent of the normative capacities of other animals, there is strong prima facie evidence for social norms and normative evaluation in chimpanzees and the main theoretical objections to chimpanzee normativity are not at all compelling. Keywords Animal cognition · Social norms · Moral psychology · Evolution of morality · Cultural evolution
Introduction This paper considers the question of whether chimpanzees possess at least a primitive sense of normativity, by which I mean some ability to internalize and enforce social norms—rules governing appropriate and inappropriate behaviour—within their social groups, and to make evaluations of others’ behaviour in light of such norms. A number of scientists and philosophers have argued that a sense of * Simon Fitzpatrick [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, 1 John Carroll Boulevard, University Heights, OH 44118, USA
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normativity does exist in chimpanzees and in several other non-human primate and mammalian species (e.g., Bekoff and Pierce 2009; Andrews 2009, 2013, 2020; Musschenga 2013; de Waal 2014; Burkart et al. 2018; Vincent et al. 2019; Monsó and Andrews, forthcoming). However, there remains in many circles considerable scepticism about the idea of there being any kind of normative reasoning in nonhuman animals, even our closest living relatives, the dominant view being that psychological capacities for social norms, normative evaluation and motivation evolved uniquely in the human lineage, after our last common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos (e.g., Kitcher 2011; Henrich 2015; Tomasello 2016; Schmidt and Rakoczy 2019). My goal in this paper is to defend the thesis of chimpanzee1 normativity (as I propose to call it) against three key objections t
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