Christopher Heath Wellman and Phillip Cole, Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There A Right to Exclude?
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Christopher Heath Wellman and Phillip Cole, Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There A Right to Exclude? New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 340 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-973172 Javier Hidalgo
Published online: 5 April 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
States restrict immigration on a massive scale. Tens of millions of people want to immigrate to other countries, but they are unable to do so because states deny them entry. Many people believe that immigration restrictions are permissible. These people think that states have moral rights to exclude potential immigrants. In Debating the Ethics of Immigration, Christopher Wellman and Phillip Cole consider whether states actually have moral rights to exclude. Wellman argues that legitimate states have rights to freedom of association and that these rights entail rights to restrict immigration. Cole rejects the view that states have rights to exclude. Wellman presents and defends the position that states have rights to restrict immigration in the first half of the book (chapters 1–10). In chapter 1, Wellman sketches his main argument for states’ rights to exclude. He begins by arguing that legitimate states have moral rights to self-determination. States have rights to selfdetermination when these states adequately protect the human rights of their citizens. Why? Wellman suggests that states are owed respect because the citizens of these states achieve something morally important (pp. 24–25). The thought seems to be that we owe people respect for their competence and achievements. If the citizens of a state competently protect human rights and maintain decent political institutions, then foreigners should respect the competence and achievement of these citizens by refraining from interfering with their internal affairs. So, legitimate states have rights to self-determination in the sense that it is wrong for outsiders to coercively interfere with the domestic affairs of legitimate states. Wellman then argues that states also have rights to freedom of association because rights to freedom of association are necessary conditions for a group to enjoy selfdetermination: ‘‘an essential part of group self-determination is exercising control J. Hidalgo (&) Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, 28 Westhampton Way, Jepson Hall, Richmond, VA 23173, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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over what the ‘self’ is’’ (p. 41). In other words, if states have rights to selfdetermination, then they also have rights to freedom of association. States would be unable to control their character and future without also controlling their membership. But, if a group of people has a right to freedom of association, then this group enjoys the moral discretion to refuse to associate with nonmembers. So, states have rights to refuse to associate with foreigners. Wellman acknowledges that rights to freedom of association are only prima facie rights. Other moral considerations can outweigh them. Nonetheless, Wellman believes that, if states h
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