Confusion within feedback control between cognitive and sensorimotor agency cues in self-other attribution
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Confusion within feedback control between cognitive and sensorimotor agency cues in self-other attribution Yu Miyawaki 1,2,3
&
Shu Morioka 1,4
# The Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2020
Abstract Self-other sensory attribution is necessary to realize feedback control because the self-attribution of sensations can drive feedback control. Some studies have suggested that self-other attribution is realized by the integration of both sensorimotor cues, including internal prediction and/or sensory feedback, and cognitive cues, such as knowledge or thought. However, in motor control, it remains unclear whether and how cognitive cues affect self-other attribution. In a feedback-control task, this study manipulated the movements (sensorimotor cue) and appearances (cognitive cue) of the cursor provided as visual feedback on participants’ sinusoidal movement. Participants were required to make a self-other attribution regarding whether the cursor’s movement reflected their actual movement without being confused by the cursor’s appearance. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that participants made illusory self-other attributions within feedback control based on cursor appearance only when the information on cursor movement was reduced by causing the cursor to flicker at 8 Hz. However, in Experiment 3, in which the cursor flickering at 4 Hz reduced the information on cursor movement to a level too low for conscious self-other attribution, cursor appearance was not utilized. Our findings suggest that the effects of cognitive cues on self-other attribution are determined by the cue integration strategy selected for the given situation. Keywords Self-other attribution . Sense of agency . Cue integration . Cognitive cue . Motor control
Introduction When people control their own movements based on sensory feedback, they typically feel that they are generating and controlling their own movements. This feeling has been referred to as the sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000; Haggard, 2017; Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Importantly, agency can drive feedback control through the self-attribution of sensations. This was shown in a study by Nielsen (1963): when participants performed a drawing task with visual feedback, the visual feedback of their actual movement was replaced with a
* Yu Miyawaki [email protected] 1
Graduate School of Health Science, Kio University, 4-2-2 Umami-naka, Koryo-cho, Kitakaturagi-gun, Nara 635-0832, Japan
2
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 5-3-1 Kojimachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0083, Japan
3
Department of Rehabilitation Medicine, Keio University School of Medicine, 35 Shinanomachi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160-8582, Japan
4
Neurorehabilitation Research Center, Kio University, 4-2-2 Umami-naka, Koryo-cho, Kitakaturagi-gun, Nara 635-0832, Japan
fake movement, without their knowing. However, participants continued to respond to the fake visual feedback without noticing the deception. These results indicated that participants try to control movements if they attribute them to themselves even if they are not
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