Consequentialist Motives for Punishment Signal Trustworthiness
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ORIGINAL PAPER
Consequentialist Motives for Punishment Signal Trustworthiness Nathan A. Dhaliwal1 · Daniel P. Skarlicki1 · JoAndrea Hoegg1 · Michael A. Daniels1 Received: 29 May 2019 / Accepted: 30 October 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Upholding cooperative norms via punishment is of central importance in organizations. But what effect does punishing have on the reputation of the punisher? Although previous research shows third parties can garner reputational benefits for punishing transgressors who violate social norms, we proposed that such reputational benefits can vary based on the perceived motive for the punishment. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing were seen as more trustworthy. In Study 3, the results showed that when pitted against one another, a person who endorsed a consequentialist (versus deontological) motive for punishing was chosen more often as a partner in a Trust Game. In Study 4, we found that a manager who expressed a consequentialist reason for punishing an employee was seen as having less psychopathic tendencies, and this related to the manager being perceived as more trustworthy and a superior cooperation partner. Using a recall methodology, Study 5 results showed that employees who perceived their managers as having more consequentialist (versus deontological) motives for punishing also perceived their managers as being less psychopathic and more trustworthy. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. Keywords Punishment · Deontology · Trust Managers are often tasked with the responsibility of addressing workplace violations in order to promote cooperation (Beyer and Trice 1984; Podsakoff and Todor 1985; Treviño 1992). Workplace violations can range from minor infractions, such as worker tardiness, to more serious problems, such as verbal harassment. Although managers can at times be reluctant to apply discipline, it is nevertheless often viewed as necessary, both from the perspective of managers themselves and of their subordinates (Butterfield et al. 1996; Gromet and Darley 2006). Current scholarship has highlighted how both the threat and the act of third-party punishing play a fundamental role in promoting cooperation within groups (Balliet et al. 2011; Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002). Third-party punishment is defined as when a third party punishes someone who has violated certain norms or defected on someone else (e.g., Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04664-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. * Nathan A. Dhaliwal [email protected] 1
UBC Sauder School of Business, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Marlowe et al. 2008).1 The tendency for third parties to punish wrongdoers is observed in workplace settings (Skarlicki et al. 2015; Treviño 1992) and to varying degrees across many cultures (Henrich et
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