Cryptanalysis of limited resource semi-quantum secret sharing

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Cryptanalysis of limited resource semi-quantum secret sharing Chia-Wei Tsai1 · Yao-Chung Chang1 · Ying-Hsun Lai1 · Chun-Wei Yang2 Received: 22 January 2020 / Accepted: 27 April 2020 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020

Abstract Li et al. (Quantum Inf Process 17(10):285, 2018) proposed a limited resource semiquantum secret sharing protocol, in which the classical participants do not equip any quantum measurement devices. However, this protocol has a security loophole. This study investigates this loophole and indicates that a malicious agent can perform the double-CNOT attack to steal partial information about the secret shadow of the other agent without being detected. Keywords Semi-quantum · Quantum secret sharing protocol · CNOT attack

Introduction The secret sharing protocol is an important issue in cryptography. Using the secret sharing protocol, a dealer, Alice, can share her secret information to multiple agents, and this secret information can only be reconstructed when sufficient agents collaborate. After Shamir proposed the first secret sharing protocol in 1979 [1], diverse secret sharing protocols were developed using classical cryptography technologies.

This comment refers to the article available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-018-2058-8.

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Chun-Wei Yang [email protected] Chia-Wei Tsai [email protected] Yao-Chung Chang [email protected] Ying-Hsun Lai [email protected]

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Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taitung University, No. 369, Sec. 2, University Rd., Taitung 95092, Taiwan

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Center for General Education and College of Humanities and Sciences, China Medical University, No. 91, Hsueh-Shih Rd., Taichung 40402, Taiwan 0123456789().: V,-vol

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Although the classical cryptography technologies can accomplish the goal of secret sharing, classical secret sharing protocols cannot detect eavesdropping. Therefore, Hillery et al. [2] used Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) states to present the first quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol; various QSS protocols have been proposed since then. In 2007, Boyer et al. [3] highlighted an important query—“Do all participants need complete quantum capabilities? Is it possible to propose a perfectly secure quantum key distribution protocol if the partial participants only have limited quantum capabilities (call classical users)?” They proposed the first semi-quantum protocol, semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol. Subsequently, a quantum information process research area, semi-quantum cryptography, has garnered increasing interest. Various semi-quantum protocols have been proposed for different applications, such as semi-quantum secret sharing, semi-quantum secure direct communication, and semiquantum private comparison. In 2018, Li et al. [4] proposed a limited resource semi-quantum secret sharing (SQSS) protocol, in which the classical agents require only two quantum capabilities. Although this SQSS protocol is relatively efficient, i