Detecting Peripheral-based Attacks on the Host Memory
This work addresses stealthy peripheral-based attacks on host computers and presents a new approach to detecting them. Peripherals can be regarded as separate systems that have a dedicated processor and dedicated runtime memory to handle their tasks. The
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Patrick Stewin
Detecting Peripheral-based Attacks on the Host Memory
T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services Series editors Sebastian Möller, Berlin, Germany Axel Küpper, Berlin, Germany Alexander Raake, Berlin, Germany
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10013
Patrick Stewin
Detecting Peripheral-based Attacks on the Host Memory
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Patrick Stewin Technische Universität Berlin Berlin Germany
ISSN 2192-2810 ISSN 2192-2829 (electronic) T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services ISBN 978-3-319-13514-4 ISBN 978-3-319-13515-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-13515-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2014955796 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
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Acknowledgments
First of all, I would especially like to thank my advisor Jean-Pierre Seifert. I am not only grateful for many useful discussions and the excellent research environment, but also for leaving me free to select my own thesis topic. His infections, encouragement, motivation, and inspiration were always greatly appreciated. Thanks to him I always believed in my research and my thesis. Next, I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to my colleagues and friends from the Chair for Security in Telecommunications (SecT) at TU Berlin. Special thanks go to Nico Golde and Dmitry Nedospasov (the Ph.D. team!) as well as Iurii Bystrov, Kévin Redon, Ravi Borgaonkar, and Collin Mulliner. Without the Ph.D. team I would still be working on my thesis. Specifically, I thank Collin for his advice in all areas. Without Iurii the Intel AMT/ME-related projects would not have been such a great success. I also would like to thank the Communication and Operating Systems (KBS) research group as well as the Workgroup for Computer Security
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