Dignity and Dissent in Humans and Non-humans
- PDF / 601,722 Bytes
- 14 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 10 Downloads / 209 Views
Dignity and Dissent in Humans and Non‑humans Andreas Matthias1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Is there a difference between human beings and those based on artificial intelligence (AI) that would affect their ability to be subjects of (human-like) dignity? This paper first examines the philosophical notion of (human) dignity as Immanuel Kant derives it from the moral autonomy of the individual. It then asks whether animals and AI systems can claim Kantian dignity or whether there is a sharp divide between human beings, animals and AI systems regarding their ability to be subjects of dignity. How this question is answered depends crucially on one’s understanding of what constitutes human dignity and autonomy, and what requirements one places upon systems in order for them to be seen as morally autonomous. Keywords Human dignity · Kant · Autonomy · Robots · Cyborgs · Extended mind
Introduction The primary question here is whether autonomously acting, decision-making artefacts, like robots and computer programs, can possess some property analogous in function to human dignity. Is the dignity of human beings something that is inextricably linked to their biological humanity, or is it a property of potentially any sufficiently complex, intelligent and autonomous system, of which human beings just happen to be the historically first instance to appear on the planet? The following sections first describe the most prominent concept of human dignity: Kantian dignity, and contrast it with Philipp Balzer and colleagues’ (Balzer, Rippe and Schaber 2000) proposal for a concept of dignity that could apply to animals. Then Kant’s understanding of moral autonomy is applied to robots and other AI systems, considering, particularly, the difficulties that arise from the distributed character of modern AI systems.
* Andreas Matthias [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, 8 Castle Peak Road, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
13
Vol.:(0123456789)
A. Matthias
What is Human Dignity? The Concept of Dignity The concept of human dignity dates back to antiquity in the form of the Roman dignitas, a kind of respect awarded to particular social roles, and can be traced through Christian variations right to present day (Rosen 2012). This paper is not concerned with these historical conceptions of dignity. Although they still exert influence on our everyday understanding of the term, the philosophically most important and influential conception of human dignity goes back to Immanuel Kant, and it is this conception that is examined here. There are a multitude of alternative conceptions of human dignity (Ashcroft 2005; Mattson and Clark 2011), which are not discussed in detail here. One could distinguish dignity as capabilities or functional characteristics (based on Sen and Nussbaum, see Nussbaum 2001), virtuous behaviour, or a particular kind of rank (Waldron 2007, 2014). One particular approach that might be fruitful for the present question is Philipp Balzer and colleagues’ (Balzer, Rippe and Schaber 2000) ana
Data Loading...
