Downstream Information Leaking and Information Sharing Between Partially Informed Retailers
- PDF / 926,057 Bytes
- 28 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 97 Downloads / 176 Views
Downstream Information Leaking and Information Sharing Between Partially Informed Retailers Wei-Shiun Chang 1
& Daniel A. Sanchez-Loor
1
Received: 30 May 2019 / Revised: 21 November 2019 Accepted: 24 February 2020 # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020
Abstract
Retailers benefit under certain conditions from horizontal information sharing, sharing information with competing retailers. However, these benefits could be hindered by the mediation of the manufacturer. Information leaking occurs when the manufacturer filters information from one retailer to the other. We focus on analyzing the impact of horizontal information sharing and information leaking on the profits of the manufacturer and retailers. We develop an analytical model with partial and asymmetric demand signals of customers’ valuation. Three scenarios are revised: no information sharing and no information leaking, information sharing, and information leaking. The originality of this study is the use of a demand process with distribution uncertainty, which imitates the information conditions of retailers who join a new market or start selling new products. These retailers own partial information but cannot determine if they are in a better information position than the other retailer. The results indicate that horizontal information sharing increases profits for the retailer with a higher demand signal, but it does not benefit the retailer with a lower demand signal. Additionally, retailers encounter their least preferred scenario if they do not agree to share information horizontally because the manufacturer will always respond by leaking information from the retailer with a higher demand signal to the other retailer. Managers of competing firms facing ambiguity about their demand information position should share information to benefit from a better demand estimation, or at least, prevent the manufacturer to use information leaking to his private benefit. Keywords Common manufacturer . Demand ambiguity . Horizontal information sharing . Information leaking . Retailer coopetition JEL Codes C72 . D82 . L14 . M10
* Wei-Shiun Chang [email protected] Extended author information available on the last page of the article
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
1 Introduction Considerable work in supply chain and operations management has recognized the potential benefits of sharing information among competitors (hereafter referred in feminine). This is a mutual and voluntary sharing among competing companies at the same echelon defined as horizontal information sharing. In the service industry, competing airlines build alliances to improve their operational performance by sharing capacity and information about demand. These practices lead to a better performance at alliance level; for instance, Star Alliance and SkyTeam Alliance have grown in revenue at an average annual rate of 5.05% since 2015 (Flight Airline Business 2019). In the manufacture of energy-saving lighting, Phillips and LED Effect (LEI) were comp
Data Loading...
