Economic inequality and electoral accountability: inequality and differences in economic voting across Western democraci
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Economic inequality and electoral accountability: inequality and differences in economic voting across Western democracies Silke Goubin1 · Marc Hooghe1 · Martin Okolikj1 · Dieter Stiers1
© Springer Nature Limited 2020
Abstract Theories on economic voting and democratic accountability are rooted in the reward–punishment hypothesis, stating that voters punish incumbent governments for economic decline and reward them for economic expansion. We argue that this accountability mechanism goes beyond economic performance indicators, as voters take into account a moral perspective about the economy as well. More specifically, we argue that when economic inequality is high, citizens’ social justice preferences are infringed upon, which could lower support for the incumbent. Moreover, as inequality leads to higher levels of conflict over economic resources, we should observe higher levels of economic voting in unequal contexts. Hence, we hypothesise that (1) economic inequality is negatively related to electoral support for the incumbent party (parties), and (2) the level of economic inequality moderates the effect of perceptions of economic performance on electoral support for the incumbent party (parties). We test our hypotheses using hierarchical models based on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the European Social Survey. While we do not find support for a direct effect of inequality on electoral support, our findings strongly support the second hypothesis: incumbents are punished more strongly for a bad economic performance when economic inequality in the country is high. Keywords Economic inequality · Economic voting · European social survey · Comparative study of electoral systems · Electoral accountability * Silke Goubin [email protected] Marc Hooghe [email protected] Martin Okolikj [email protected] Dieter Stiers [email protected] 1
KU Leuven, Parkstraat 45, B3602, 3000 Leuven, Belgium Vol.:(0123456789)
S. Goubin et al.
Introduction Within advanced liberal democracies, there is a growing concern about rising levels of economic inequality and the consequences this trend might have for social cohesion and the quality of democracy (Piketty 2014). This debate has been fuelled by the concern that more inequality makes a growing proportion of the population feel deprived of an equitable access to economic resources (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Moreover, socio-psychological research has related inequality to higher levels of status anxiety and anti-social behaviour, as inequality increases the distance between citizens in terms of living standards and, hence, fuels the competition over economic resources and status (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). In political science research, inequality has therefore been hypothesised to lead to political polarisation, higher levels of protest behaviour, elite-challenging behaviour, and lower levels of support for democratic institutions and procedures (Kern et al. 2015; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Much less is known, however, about how inequ
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