Emergent Powers
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Emergent Powers Michele Paolini Paoletti1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract I shall introduce at the beginning of the paper a characterization of strong ontological emergence. According to it, roughly, something strongly emerges from some other thing(s) iff the former depends in some respect on the latter and it some independent of it in some other respect. Afterwards, I shall present my own formulation of strong emergence, which is based on the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a causal power. Causal powers are the entities to be primarily taken as emergent. Emergent causal powers depend for their possession on their emergence bases, but they are also independent of the latter (and on further relevantly similar entities) for their activation. This claim will be defended within some more general assumptions about the metaphysics of powers. Finally, I shall compare the power-based formulation of emergence with other formulations. I shall try to demonstrate that the power-based formulation is (all other things being equal) metaphysically less controversial than the other formulations. For the power-based formulation (unlike the other formulations) does not need to defend the additional thesis that the emergents can depend in some relevant respect on their bases and be independent of the latter in some other relevant respect. Indeed, the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a power (and the possibility of having the former without the latter) is inscribed in the nature of powers themselves. Keywords Powers · Emergence · Causation The nature of emergence is a thorny issue. In this article, I shall try to clarify it by looking at causal powers. In the first section, I shall draw a distinction between weak and strong ontological emergence and I shall recall two formulation schemes for both varieties of emergence. In the second and third section, I shall defend some assumptions on the nature of powers and on their relationship with causation in the light of the recent literature on powers. In the fourth section, I shall recall and refine my own characterization of emergent powers. Finally, in the fifth and sixth section, I shall argue that a formulation of emergence based on powers is metaphysically less controversial than other formulations based on other sorts of entities. I shall also anticipate some objections and replies. With respect to my own previous works on emergence and emergent powers, I aim at refining here the formulation of strong emergence for powers, at inquiring into the * Michele Paolini Paoletti [email protected] 1
Department of Human Studies, Università degli Studi di Macerata (Italy), Via Garibaldi 20, 62100 Macerata, MC, Italy
metaphysics of powers from a broader perspective and at arguing that my account of emergence should be favoured over other rival accounts.1
1 On Emergence Emergence can be intuitively characterized as dependent novelty. Something emerges from some other thing(s) iff it both depends (in some way) on the
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