Event-triggered Output Feedback Resilient Control for NCSs under Deception Attacks
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ISSN:1598-6446 eISSN:2005-4092 http://www.springer.com/12555
Event-triggered Output Feedback Resilient Control for NCSs under Deception Attacks Lisai Gao, Fuqiang Li*, and Jingqi Fu Abstract: This paper studies event-triggered output feedback resilient control for networked control systems (NCSs) under stochastic deception attacks following a Bernoulli distribution. Unlike continuous event-triggered mechanism (ETM) requiring dedicated hardware and complex Zeno-avoidance computation, an output-based discrete ETM is firstly introduced, which overcomes limits of continuous ETM and relaxes state-available constraint. Secondly, a novel time-delay system model is established, which makes it possible to study effects of the ETM, stochastic attacks and network-induced delays in a unified framework. Thirdly, less-conservative asymptotic stability criteria with desired H∞ index are obtained, which derive quantitative relationships among the ETM, stochastic attacks, network delays, plant and resilient controller. Further, sufficient conditions to co-deign the ETM and resilient controller are presented. Finally, examples confirm effectiveness of the proposed method. Keywords: Deception attacks, dynamic output feedback control, event-triggered control, networked control system, resilient control.
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INTRODUCTION
Networked control systems are complex systems where spatially distributed system components exchange information through a shared network [1]. Due to many advantages such as high flexibility and low cost, NCSs have many application domains such as smart grid [2]. However, due to introducing public network into control loop, NCSs are vulnerable to cyber attacks. In general, these attacks can be roughly classified into denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and deception attacks. DoS attacks can prohibit transmission of measurement and control signals by jamming communication network [3]. Deception attacks can destroy data integrity of transmitted packets by false data injection [4]. Since deception attacks do harm to NCSs in a stealthy and unpredictable way, they often cause serious damages to critical infrastructures. For instance, Stuxnet worm has reprogrammed code in programmable logic controller of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and destroyed one fifth of centrifuges in Iranian nuclear plant [5]. Black Energy malware compromised three
Ukrainian regional power distribution companies, and caused power blackout affecting approximately 225,000 customers for several hours [6]. Stealthy deception attacks can bypass detection of water SCADA system and enable remote water pilfering in Gignac canal system in Southern France [7]. Although deception attacks are very destructive, the research of them is not enough, which motivates us to concern them in this paper. Since deception attacks may arbitrarily disturb system dynamics or induce any perturbation, secure control for the attacked NCSs is an important and challenging task. The main secure control methods are time-delay system method, hybrid system met
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