Evidentialism in action
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Evidentialism in action A. K. Flowerree1
Ó Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to use a distinction from Pamela Hieronymi) reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some (or perhaps all) reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: (1) the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; (2) Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; (3) agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. Keywords Ethics of belief Evidentialism Pragmatism Practical reasons for belief Philosophy of action
& A. K. Flowerree [email protected] 1
Philosophy Department, Texas Tech University, Box 43092, Lubbock, TX 79409, USA
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A. K. Flowerree
1 Introduction BOOK Suppose you learn that if you believe you are a brilliant philosopher, you are far more likely to finish writing your first book. Suppose, further, that philosophy is the sort of discipline in which it is very difficult to assess whether someone who has not yet finished her book is a brilliant philosopher. Your evidence for your brilliance is not very clear. But your tenure clock is ticking, and you must finish in order to remain gainfully employed. Should you believe you are brilliant, though your soul is weary and your confidence wearing thin? BOOK raises a perennial philosophical question. When our evidence suggests we should believe one thing, and our practical interests suggest another, what should we believe? Philosophers have taken cases like BOOK to be asking are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. According to many Evidentialists, I cannot believe for practical reasons because reasons for belief are picked out by their functional role: reasons for belief that p are considerations that bear on the truth of p.1 There cannot be practical reasons for belief because practical reasons cannot play the right role (in showing p to be true).2 Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to use language from Pamela Hieronymi) reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some (or perhaps all) reasons for belief are practical. That is, a
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