Finding satisfaction in presentism
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Finding satisfaction in presentism Robert E. Pezet1 Received: 7 May 2018 / Accepted: 6 September 2018 © Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract This paper argues for a pragmatic motivation for believing Presentism—the thesis that everything is present. After outlining a pragmatic source of justification for beliefs, in terms of their action-guiding aims, a pragmatic motivation for believing presentism is detailed and proffered. More specifically, the paper outlines two kinds of bases for our desires: a negative and a positive basis. The former concerns some dissatisfaction with a certain aspect of our present state, whilst the latter focuses instead on our potential future gratification or contentment. An account of desire satisfaction needs to, in some sense, “answers” to either of these kinds of bases. However, it is argued that only presentism can support an adequate conception of desire satisfaction (that allows for adequate “answers” to those bases). And although non-presentists can support a form of desire prevention (essentially preventing the arising of desire bases demanding “answers”), this severely lessens the effectiveness of beliefs to fulfil their aims. Accordingly, presentism is best able to support beliefs in achieving their action-guiding aims. It is claimed that this provides some pragmatic justification for believing presentism. Keywords Desire satisfaction · Pragmatic motivation · Presentism · Time
1 A methodological prelude This paper aims to outline a pragmatic motivation for believing Presentism—the thesis that all and only present things exist. I assume that beliefs ultimately serve an action-guiding aim, their value residing in their instrumental utility of guiding actions,
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Robert E. Pezet [email protected] Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK
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instructed by our will, towards the satisfaction of our desires.1 Their value is therefore contingent upon our status as agents, in our ability to act. And accordingly, the aim of belief compels a pragmatic bias towards believing that we are agents, and that we can act. If we did not believe this, our beliefs would cease to guide our actions—since they would inform us that we cannot act and of the futility of trying—and consequently we would not act (on beliefs).2 And in general, it seems we have compelling (pragmatic) grounds for belief in anything that must be the case for beliefs to have any chance of fulfilling their action-guiding aim. Call beliefs that are justified in this way by the aim of belief, functionally essential beliefs. It seems that the aim of belief motivates our upholding such functionally essential beliefs even in the face of countervailing evidence.3 Likewise, I take it that our beliefs will be instrumentally more valuable to the extent that they allow us to act effectively (in satisfying our intentions or desires). To make this a bit clearer, there are two kinds of assessments of instrumental value that can be made here: subjective and objective valuations. The former concerns whether, a
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