Free Will and Mental Powers
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Free Will and Mental Powers Niels van Miltenburg1 · Dawa Ometto2
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract In this paper, we investigate how contemporary metaphysics of powers can further an understanding of agent-causal theories of free will. The recent upsurge of such ontologies of powers and the understanding of causation it affords promises to demystify the notion of an agent-causal power. However, as we argue pace (Mumford and Anjum in Analysis 74:20–25, 2013; Am Philos Q 52:1–12, 2015a), the very ubiquity of powers also poses a challenge to understanding in what sense exercises of an agent’s power to act could still be free—neither determined by external circumstances, nor random, but self-determined. To overcome this challenge, we must understand what distinguishes the power to act from ordinary powers. We suggest this difference lies in its rational nature, and argue that existing agent-causal accounts (e.g., O’Connor in Libertarian views: dualist and agent-causal theories, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002; Lowe in Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) fail to capture the sense in which the power to act is rational. A proper understanding, we argue, requires us to combine the recent idea that the power to act is a ‘two-way power’ (e.g., Steward in A metaphysics for freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012b; Lowe (in: Groff, Greco (eds) Powers and capacities in philosophy: the new aristotelianism, Routledge, New York, 2013) with the idea that it is intrinsically rational. We sketch the outlines of an original account that promises to do this. On this picture, what distinguishes the power to act is its special generality—the power to act, unlike ordinary powers, does not come with any one typical manifestation. We argue that this special generality can be understood to be a feature of the capacity to reason. Thus, we argue, an account of agent-causation that can further our understanding of free will requires us to recognize a specifically rational or mental variety of power. Keywords Powers · Agent-causation · Free will · Incompatibilism · Two-way powers
1 Introduction Free will is puzzling. It seems clear that we have the capacity to control our own actions. But it can seem impossible to comprehend exactly how such a capacity can exist. One of the main obstacles to understanding free will is that it seems to make two opposite demands. Free will is often associated with a lack of determination: an agent’s movements do not Niels van Miltenburg and Dawa Ometto have contributed equally to this work. * Niels van Miltenburg [email protected] Dawa Ometto dawa.ometto@uni‑leipzig.de 1
Department of Philosophy and Religious Sciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Institut für Philosophie, Universität Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany
2
seem to be up to her if it was already settled long before her birth that she would make them.1 This intuition undergirds the so-called libertarian view that the existence of free will is not reconcilab
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