Freedom of Action, Freedom of Choice, and Desistance from Crime: Pitfalls and Opportunities in the Study of Human Agency

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Freedom of Action, Freedom of Choice, and Desistance from Crime: Pitfalls and Opportunities in the Study of Human Agency Timothy Brezina 1 Received: 17 May 2018 / Revised: 4 April 2019 / Accepted: 9 April 2019 # Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Abstract Purpose In a recent issue of JDLCC, readers were presented with two opposing views of human agency and its value to life-course criminology. Paternoster (J Dev Life Course Criminol 3(4):350–372, 2017) proposes that agency be embraced as a key organizing concept in criminology, arguing that it is central to offender decision making and desistance from crime. In response, Cullen (J Dev Life Course Criminol 3(4):373– 379, 2017) downplays the role of agency. He further argues that an emphasis on agency is antithetical to positivism, would undermine the search for the developmental and lifecourse causes of crime, and would legitimize punitive crime control policies. In this paper, I highlight the existence of a theoretical middle ground in the form of an alternative conceptualization of agency. In particular, I highlight the value of Albert Bandura’s sociocognitive approach to agency. Instead of asking whether agency plays a role in behavior, this approach leads us to ask the following: when, and under what conditions, is the meaningful exercise of agency likely to occur? Conclusion I argue that a sociocognitive approach largely avoids the potential pitfalls identified by Cullen and can readily be adapted to the contemporary study of desistance. It also draws attention to issues in need of further examination and can inspire new lines of desistance research. Keywords Human agency . Criminological theory . Social cognitive theory . Desistance

In a recent issue of JDLCC, readers were presented with two opposing views of human agency and its value to life-course criminology. Drawing on the work of philosophers,

* Timothy Brezina [email protected]

1

Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992, USA

T. Brezina

Paternoster [37] argues that agency is intrinsic to all purposeful action and, in doing so, he highlights the centrality of agency to offender decision-making and desistance from crime. In the end, he proposes that agency be embraced as a key organizing concept. He also outlines what this would mean for the future of criminology. Instead of focusing on antecedent causal factors and portraying actors as more determined than they really are, criminologists would explore teleological explanations and would focus greater attention on the goals and intentions that exist in the minds of offenders. In response, Cullen [14] argues that research highlighting the role of agency is flawed and that its significance has been overstated. He further argues that an emphasis on agency is antithetical to positivism, would undermine the search for the developmental and life-course causes of crime, and would legitimize punitive crime control policies. Given these strong opposing views, one may be tempted to conclu