Games with Strategic Complements
Codirectional incentives formalize situations in which participants have an incentive to move in the same direction as other participants. Payoff functions with a combination of increasing differences, supermodularity, single crossing property, and quasis
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Tarun Sabarwal
Monotone Games
Tarun Sabarwal
Monotone Games A Unified Approach to Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes
Tarun Sabarwal Department of Economics The University of Kansas Lawrence, KS, USA
ISBN 978-3-030-45512-5 ISBN 978-3-030-45513-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45513-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover design: Pattern © Harvey Loake This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
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Preface
In many socioeconomic situations, decentralized decisions with interdependent effects may be studied using the framework of monotone games. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a manner that unifies the study of games with strategic complements, games with strategic substitutes, and combinations of the two. Games with strategic complements have been studied for some time now and specialized cases of strategic substitutes are known as well. The study of general games with strategic substitutes and the study of general games with both strategic complements and substitutes are newer. The newer results are scattered in academic journals and unavailable in an integral form. Systematic connections across different classes of games are unavailable as well. A goal here is to develop anew the foundations of all three classes of games in a unified manner under the umbrella of monotone games. In the process, existing results across different classes of games are proved anew under uniform assumptions and with a focus on unifying arguments, fundamental concepts are isolated and developed independently, new resu
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