Generalising NSL for Multi-party Authentication
We present a protocol for multi-party authentication for any number of parties, which generalises the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. We show that the protocol satisfies injective synchronisation of the communicating parties and secrecy of the generated
- PDF / 3,626,124 Bytes
- 176 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 4 Downloads / 144 Views
Series Editors David Basin Kenny Paterson Advisory Board Michael Backes Gilles Barthe Ronald Cramer Ivan Damgård Andrew D. Gordon Joshua D. Guttman Ueli Maurer Tatsuaki Okamoto Bart Preneel
For further volumes: www.springer.com/series/4752
Cas Cremers r Sjouke Mauw
Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols
Cas Cremers Department of Computer Science ETH Zürich Zürich, Switzerland
Sjouke Mauw Computer Science and Communications Research Unit University of Luxembourg Luxembourg, Luxembourg
ISSN 1619-7100 Information Security and Cryptography ISBN 978-3-540-78635-1 ISBN 978-3-540-78636-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-78636-8 Springer Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London Library of Congress Control Number: 2012952288 ACM Computing Classification (1998): C.2, K.6, E.3 © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Preface
About ten years ago, Sjouke Mauw and Erik de Vink established the computer security research group at the Eindhoven University of Technology. Given their background in formal methods, they focused on the formal modeling of security protocols and their properties. The underlying assumption was that reasoning in a relatively simple model, based on well-understood notions from the area
Data Loading...
