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several example input and output files illustrating typical formats. Availability. Toobtain a complete copy of the CSPRED program (i.e., executable file, source code, program documentation, and example files), send a 3.5-in. IBM diskette and self-addressed and post-paid disk mailer to the first author. Alternatively,these materials can be obtained from the COMPSYCH archive. COMPSYCH can be reached on the Web at htp://www.plattsburgh.edu/compsych, and files can be retrieved from the COMPSYCH archive by anonymous ftp to gluon.hawk.plattsburgh.edu. REFERENCES BANZHAF, 1. E, III (1965). Weighted voting doesn't work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review, 19, 317-343. BORLAND INTERNATIONAL, INC. (1992). Turbo pascal (Version 7.0) [Language Guide, User's Guide, Programmer's Reference, software]. Scotts Valley, CA: Author. CROTT, H. w., & ALBERS, W. (1981). The equal division kernel: An equity approach to coalition formation and payoff distribution in N-person games. European Journal ofSocial Psychology, 11, 285-305. DAVIS, M., & MASCHLER, M. (1965). The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 12,223-259. KAHAN, J. P., & RAPOPORT, A. (1984). Theories ofcoalition formation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. KOMORITA, S. S., & CHERTKOFF, 1. M. (1973). A bargaining theory of coalition formation. Psychological Review, 80,149-162. KOMORITA, S. S., HAMILTON, T. P., & KRAVITZ, D. A. (1984). Effects of alternatives in coalition bargaining. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology, 20,116-136. KOMORITA, S. S., & TuMONIS, T. M. (1980). Extensions and tests of some descriptive theories of coalition formation. Journal ofPersonality & Social Psychology, 39, 256-268. KRAVITZ, D. A., & WALKER, J. A. (1989). COALPRED: A BASIC program for computing predictions of five coalition theories. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 16,69-70. MYERSON, R. B. (1977). Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics ofOperations Research, 2, 225-229. ROTH, A. E. (1977). The Shapley value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Econometrica, 45, 657-664. SAKURAI, M. M., & BRENNAN, J. M. (1988). Computing the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function v(S) for cooperative n-person transferable utility normal form games: LP and saddlepoint solutions. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 20,367-371. SAKURAI, M. M., & BRENNAN, J. M. (1990). Computing the constrained game function CGF(S) for n-person cooperative transferable utility normal form games. Computers in Human Behavior, 6, 323-335. Note-The CSPRED program was developed in part under Grant SES9208525 from the National Science Foundation and Grant 950463 from the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The authors express appreciation to David M. Wolfe and Wing Tung Au for their contributions toward the development of this software.

H. Andrew Michener and Daniel 1. Myers University of Wisconsin, Madison

(Manuscript received October 23, 1995; revision accepted for publication December 14, 1995.)

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