God* does not exist: a novel logical problem of evil
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God* does not exist: a novel logical problem of evil P. X. Monaghan1 Received: 19 May 2019 / Accepted: 19 November 2019 © Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or unsound. As a result, the focus has entirely shifted from the logical problem of evil to the so-called evidential one. But I think that this is a mistake, not necessarily because I think Mackie’s argument is sound, but rather because I reject an assumption made by apparently all parties to the debate, which is that there is only one logical problem of evil. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to defend a deductive argument that God* does not exist. As far as I can tell, the basic idea of this argument is a novel one: while Mackie’s argument (and much of the discussion that occurs in its wake) has a more or less consequentialist framework, mine has a deontological one. The evil of which I will speak is that of our having been thrown into the world. Keywords God* · Atheism · Creation · Respect 1. I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or unsound.1 As a result, the focus has entirely shifted from the logical problem of evil to the so-called evidential 1 For an example of a theist who thinks this, see Adams (2000). For an example of an agnostic who thinks this, see Draper (1989). And for an example of an atheist who thinks this, see Rowe (1979). For Mackie’s original argument, see his (1955).
* P. X. Monaghan [email protected] 1
Doane College, Crete, NE, USA
13
Vol.:(0123456789)
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
one.2 But I think that this is a mistake, not necessarily because I think Mackie’s argument is sound,3 but rather because I reject an assumption made by apparently all parties to the debate, which is that there is only one logical problem of evil. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to defend a deductive argument that God* does not exist.4 As far as I can tell, the basic idea of this argument is a novel one: While Mackie’s argument (and much of the discussion that occurs in its wake) has a more or less consequentialist framework,5 mine has a deontological one. The evil of which I will speak i
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