How do moral theories stand to each other?
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How do moral theories stand to each other? Some moral metatheoretical thoughts on a longstanding rivalry Svantje Guinebert
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract Moral theories, such as the variations on virtue ethics, deontological ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism, are expected – inter alia – to explain the basic orientation of morality, give us principles and directives, justify those, and thereby (if all goes well) guide our actions. I examine some functions and characteristics of the extant moral theories from a moral metatheoretical point of view, in order to clarify the generally assumed rivalry between them. By thinking of moral theories in analogy to languages it is argued that different moral theories are neither simply competing nor simply complementary; their respective orientations justify using them, in virtue of the problems they help to solve. But even if considerations about the functionality of a theory and the context in which it is created play an important role, they can neither be sufficient to determine these theories’ relations to one other nor for choosing between them. The challenge is to set criteria for the quality of a moral theory on a moral metatheoretical level and, in particular, to make room for future views on morality. Keywords moral metatheory · moral theories · linguistic analogy · theory multiplism · spheres of morality
1 Introduction Outside the university campus, people are wondering what they ought to do, but inside academic moral philosophy the question generally is: which theory about what to do is superior? S. Guinebert () Institute of Philosophy, University of Bremen, Enrique-Schmidt-Str. 7, 330 440, 28359 Bremen, Germany E-Mail: [email protected]
S. Guinebert
A moral theory consists of more or less connected claims arranged to determine what a morally good or right action or stance is, and what it is that makes it either right or good. It thereby conveys, more or less implicitly, a set of assumptions as to what morality is; that view in turn specifies the type of norms or rules to be found and how they can be grounded. The many variations on virtue ethics, deontological ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism, present us with interesting proposals. Moral theories, understood this way, are generally supposed to be mutually exclusive: their multitude and diversity raises the question whether one moral theory should be accepted as the only right or true one. The aim of this article is to examine some of the functions and characteristics of classic moral theories from a moral metatheoretical point of view, and to consider how far seeing moral theories as analogous to grammars clarifies what is generally assumed to be the rivalry between them. How can we approach the question of what makes a moral theory good or right? What are the specific strengths of different moral theories and how are we to assess their aims and scopes? Can we seek out specific spheres of life that invite the deployment of one kind of moral theory rather than another? I will
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