How Popular Has the ECB Been? Popularity, Protest, and Populism Post Crisis

The European Central Bank (ECB) has on average been successful in reducing the extent of euphoria on financial markets and avoiding an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) meltdown. This apparent success story leads to a thorny question, however: does the EC

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How Popular Has the ECB Been? Popularity, Protest, and Populism Post Crisis

6.1   Introduction This chapter analyses empirically how the perception of the ECB has changed in the eyes of the public and discusses its broader implications, by juxtaposing the available survey data (Eurobarometer) against macroeconomic data (see Drechsler et al. 2016; Eser and Schwaab 2016). We will assess, in particular, whether a changing economic and political environment—including protests and the upsurge of anti-establishment parties— can be reconciled with the outcome of outright survey questions about the ECB’s popularity. The ECB has, on average, been perceived as successful in stabilising core-periphery spreads and reducing the extent of euphoria in financial markets (see De Grauwe et al. 2017). However, a key question that emerges is whether the ECB’s “market success” is reflected in the survey data about the central bank’s effectiveness and popularity. As we will demonstrate, the central bank was not granted popular praise, which has important implications for populist threats to its independence.

© The Author(s) 2020 C. Macchiarelli et al., The European Central Bank between the Financial Crisis and Populisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44348-1_6

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6.2   Citizens, Support, and Trust in the EU During the Financial Crisis: What Do Eurobarometer Data Tell? When it comes to operationalising the legitimacy of the European Union, the classical indicators of identification and support that have been introduced in Chap. 1 (see Easton 1953) can provide a first impression. As pointed out before, these dimensions may not reflect a definition of legitimacy per se, but they are closely intertwined. If a citizen expresses support for the EU and belonging to the EU, it is probable he or she will also believe the EU is a political order “worthy to be recognised as legitimate” (Wiesner and Harfst 2019). When analysing the dynamics of the different indicators measured in Eurobarometer, it becomes evident that these changed decisively during the crisis. Starting with a general overview of headline Eurobarometer data, we can see that EU citizens in their majority identify themselves as citizens of the EU or the EU and their home country. According to the Eurobarometer Survey at the time of the UK referendum to leave the Union (Eurobarometer 2016: 14–16), roughly two-thirds of respondents felt that they were citizens of the EU (66%), and in 25 out of 28 member states, those respondents formed a majority. There were, however, considerable national variations. In Luxemburg, nearly all citizens felt as EU citizens (93%), followed by Malta (84%), Finland (82%), and Ireland (80%). Interestingly enough, even a majority of UK citizens (53%) said they felt they were citizens of the EU at the time. In Italy and Bulgaria (both 49%), the respondents feeling as EU citizens were less than the majority, and Greece was the only member state where a majority responded not to consider themselves EU citizens (54% “No” an