How to Think About Meaning
According to the dominant theory of meaning, truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Classical truth-conditional semantics is coming under increasing attack, h
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Philosophical Studies Series VOLUME 109
Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer Editor Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson Associate Editor Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe Board of Consulting Editors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans Marian David, University of Notre Dame John M. Fischer, University of California at Riverside Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas at Austin Stuart Silvers, Clemson University Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College Linda Zagzebski, University of Okalahoma
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
HOW TO THINK ABOUT MEANING PAUL SAKA University of Houston, TX, USA
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-1-4020-5856-1 (HB) ISBN 978-1-4020-5857-8 (e-book) Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved ©2007 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
I think that the notion of meaning is always more or less psychological, and that it is not possible to get a pure logical theory of meaning or of the symbol. I think that it is the essence of the explanation of what you mean by a symbol to take account of such things as knowing, of cognitive relations, and probably also of association. – Bertrand Russell, 1918: 45
CONTENTS
Preface
xi
Notational Conventions
xiii
PART I: THEORETICAL ISSUES Chapter 1. Introduction
3
1. Semantics with Attitude 2. Ends and Means 3. The State of Play 3.1 Truth Theory and Model Theory 3.2 Direct Reference and Mediated Reference 3.3 Realism and Verificationism 3.4 Assertability Semantics 3.5 Technical and Formalist Semantics 3.6 Minimalism and Contextualism 3.7 Speech-Act Theory 3.8 Intention-Based Semantics 3.9 Conceptual Role Semantics 3.10 Cognitive Semantics
3 8 18 19 21 22 24 25 27 28 30 31 32
Chapter 2. The Case of the Missing Truth-Conditions
35
1. The Argument from Ignorance 1.1 Ignorance Regarding Non-Declaratives 1.2 Ignorance ad Nauseam 2. Truth-Conditionalist Maneuvers 2.1 Ignorance of Meaning 2.2 Knowledge of Disquotational T-Sentences 2.3 Half and Half 2.4 Dialects
36 36 39 41 42 43 44 45
vii
viii
Contents
3. Extending the Argument from Ignorance 3.1 Depth of TCs: Total vs. Partial 3.2 Breadth of TCs: General vs. Delimited 3.3 Strength of TCs: Strong vs. Weak 3.4 Status of TCs: Epistemic vs. Ontic 3.5 Modali
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