Human nature and the first image: emotion in international politics

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Analysts commonly view emotion as irrational, as part of human nature, and therefore as part of a first-image approach to politics. However, emotion is necessary to rationality and first-image and human nature arguments are not synonymous. A first-image explanation can be independent of human nature, and a human nature argument can be used at different levels-of-analysis. This essay first explores the relationship between emotion and rationality and breaks the literature on emotion down into four groups: as epiphenomenal, as a source of irrationality, as a tool for savvy strategic actors, and as a necessary aspect of rationality. After developing different approaches to emotion, the essay explores three uses of emotion at different levels-of-analysis. Journal of International Relations and Development (2006) 9, 288–303. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800091 Keywords: emotion; human nature; rationality

Introduction Emotion is part of human nature. It makes life worth living and it influences our behaviour. But how important is it for explaining international politics? Most analysts view emotion as epiphenomenal at best and a source of irrationality at worst. In either case, Kenneth Waltz (1959) viewed emotion as being rooted squarely in a first-image approach to international politics. I view emotion differently in two respects. First, emotion can undermine rationality but rationality also depends on emotion. Part one of this essay discusses four approaches to emotion: as epiphenomenal, as a source of irrationality, as a tool for savvy strategic actors, and as a necessary aspect of rationality. The fourth approach is the least explored and to me the most interesting. Second, human nature and first-image approaches are not synonymous. For example, rational choice can be a first-image approach because it focuses on individual rationality, but it is primarily a normative (rather than a positive) theory and is thus unrelated to human nature (Elster 1986). Rational choice theorists do not claim to describe how people actually make decisions, but focus instead Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006, 9, (288–303) r 2006 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 1408-6980/06 $30.00

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Jonathan Mercer Human Nature and the First Image

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on how they ought to make decisions if they want to be rational. The closer one adheres to the normative ideal, the more rational the process and presumably the better the outcome. A first-image approach need not rely on human nature, but must an explanation that relies on human nature be a first-image approach? Human nature can contribute to first-, second-, or third-image approaches. An ‘image’ or ‘level-of-analysis’ approach is a way to organize theory according to the explanatory variable. No level is ‘better’ than another and no level is necessarily more parsimonious or generalizable than another (Mercer 2005b). A ‘cause’ can be at any level-of-analysis. One can explain the United States (US) led preventive war against Iraq by emphasizing President Bush’s mi