Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and wi
The so-called Defense Efficiency Hypothesis (DEH) says that conventional forces designed specifically for defensive operations and, thus incapable of any major offensive operations can exploit the intrinsic defense advantage more efficiently than forces d
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Game Equilibrium ModelsN Social and Political Interaction With Contributions by R. Avenhaus, R. Gardner, W. Giith, R. K. Huber M. Mitzkewitz, A. Okada, B. O'Neill, J. Pool J. Potters, R. Selten, F. van Winden, D. Wendt S. Zamir With 55 Figures
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg GmbH
Professor Dr. Reinhard Selten Institut flir Gesellschaft- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universitiit Bonn Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung 1 Adenauerallee 24-42 D-5300 Bonn 1, FRG
ISBN 978-3-642-08111-8 ISBN 978-3-662-07369-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-07369-8
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Original1y published by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heide1berg New York Tokyo in 1991 Softcover reprint of tbe hardcover 1st edition 1991 The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. 214217130-543210
Preface to the Series "Game Equilibrium Models" The four volumes of the series "Game Equilibrium Models" are the result of year at the Center for Interd i sci p1i nary Research of the Uni vers tty of Germany. The German name of this center is Zentrum fur interdisziplinare but everybody who is familiar with this unique i nst i tut ion refers to official acronym liF.
a research Bi e1efe 1d, Forschung, it by the
In the time from October 1, 1987, to September 30, 1988, the ZiF was the home of the interdisciplinary research group which produced the papers in the four volumes of this series. Participants coming from many parts of the world 1ived in the guest apartments of the ZiF for the whole time or part of it and worked on a common project. The name of the project was "Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences". It occurred to me only later that "Game Equilibrium Models" - the title of the series even more appropriately indicates the unifying theme of the research group. Among the participants were economists, biologists, mathematicians, political scientists, psychologists and a philosopher. A lively interaction resulted from the mix of disciplines. The common methodological basis of non-cooperative theory was the shared culture which facilitated communication across disciplines. The intense exchange of ide as coming from different fie 1ds had a profound influence on the thinking of many among the participants. It was not easy to find a coherent way to group the papers into the four volumes and t
