In the beginning was violence: Emmanuel Levinas on religion and violence
- PDF / 573,944 Bytes
- 16 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 69 Downloads / 190 Views
In the beginning was violence: Emmanuel Levinas on religion and violence Ruud Welten1,2
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract It is the aim of this contribution to question the two conceptions of violence in the later Levinas. One of the face, the other the violence that must be overcome by the face. The article argues that this cannot be understood fully without taking into account Levinas’ Talmudic philosophy. By focusing on the notion of trauma in the later work of Levinas, it is argued that Levinas’ idea of the human subject is understood as radical vulnerability. This idea is evaluated on the basis of short comparisons with the thinking of Lacan, Žižek and Camus. The claim is made that to Levinas, violence is not a phenomenon to be eliminated by rational ethics, but one that forms the very notion of humanity itself. This is elaborated by showing how the Bible takes on a central role in Levinas’ thought. Keywords Emmanuel Levinas · Violence · Trauma · Religion Without a doubt, the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is a philosophy against violence. It is a philosophy after the ultimate violence of the Holocaust; a violence that is not committed against individuals only, but against the dignity of humanity as such. Counter-violence is famously understood by Levinas as the face of the other. The face appeals to my humanity and makes me, and only me, responsible for the suffering of the other. Yet, after the encounter of the face, the subject is no longer able to understand itself as the outcome of his own moral intentions. It cannot even be understood as a guideline for ethical conduct. To Levinas, the face is not the bringer of peace, but of anarchy. It commands in a disturbing way. The face disturbs the order of the ego in a violent way. Isn’t it counter-intuitive to understand the face as violence, since, according to its original ethical claim, it exactly overcomes * Ruud Welten [email protected] 1
Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
2
Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands
13
Vol.:(0123456789)
R. Welten
violence? Is violence indeed conquered by the face of the other, and if so, isn’t this conquest only possible because of its violence? Is the face—unbearable as it seems to be—the necessary evil which makes me ethical? In other words: Is ethics as first discipline the solution to violence or is it rather the cause? So regarding Levinas, it seems that we have to deal with at least two notions of violence. One of the face, the other the violence that must be overcome by the face. It is my aim to question these two conceptions of violence in the later Levinas. And as will become clear, this cannot be understood fully without taking into account Levinas’ Talmudic philosophy.
1 Trauma The face of the other is exactly not a tender appeal of love, but—as far as the subject is understood as a self-constitutive power—a violence that injures the subject. It i
Data Loading...
