Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility
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Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility Garry Young 1
& Daniel
Coren 2
Received: 16 July 2020 / Accepted: 9 November 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In this paper, we motivate, propose and defend the following two conditions as individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary for moral responsibility: (1) PODMA(s) (the principle of doxastic moral asymmetry)—originally proposed by Coren, Acta Analytica, 33, 145–159, (2018), now cast as sufficient rather than necessary—and (2) the TWC* (twin world condition), which amends versions presented by Young (Philosophia, 44(3), 961–969, 2016; Philosophia, 45(3), 1365–1380, 2017). We explain why there is a need for new necessary and sufficient conditions, how these build on and improve existing ideas, particularly in relation to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and the continuing discussion on their effectiveness, and why PODMA(s) and the TWC* are good candidates. Finally, we defend the proposal against anticipated objections in order to clarify why we think these individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary conditions are plausible and able to inform the ongoing debate on the role of alternate possibilities in the ascription of moral responsibility. Keywords Principle of alternate possibilities . Principle of doxastic moral asymmetry .
Frankfurt-style counterexamples . Twin world condition . Praiseworthiness/ blameworthiness
1 Introduction The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) says: “A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” (Frankfurt 1969, p. 829; * Garry Young [email protected] Daniel Coren [email protected]
1
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia
2
Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada
G. Young, D. Coren
emphasis added). PAP posits the following ontological position: “There are no possible worlds in which it is true both that some agent is morally responsible, and that this agent has no alternative possibilities available to him” (Elzein 2017, p. 170). Ever since Harry Frankfurt first attacked PAP through his use of what has now become known as the ‘Frankfurt-style counterexample’ (hereafter, FSC), philosophers have devoted a great deal of attention to FSCs, their variants and their implications for PAP and related principles. Our aim is to motivate, propose and defend modified versions of the following two conditions for the ascription of moral responsibility, originally proposed by Coren (2018) and Young (2016, 2017): the principle of doxastic moral asymmetry (PODMA) and the twin world condition (TWC). It is our contention that each is individually sufficient, but only one must be satisfied at any given time for the ascription of moral responsibility. In their modified form, we will refer to these as PODMA(s) and the TWC*, respectively. While we see the proposal as something of a departure from established views (to be di
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