Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation
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Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation Daniel Mun˜oz1
Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Supererogatory acts are those that lie ‘‘beyond the call of duty.’’ There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when (1) options are infinite, or when (2) there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma. Keywords Supererogation Deontology Intransitivity of value Deontic logic Normative ethics Spectrum Argument Infinite option sets
1 Introduction Many good deeds lie ‘‘beyond the call of duty.’’ Think of heroic sacrifices, thoughtful favors, and gifts of forgiveness. These are all wonderful things to do, and yet they seem optional rather than obligatory. Such acts are called supererogatory. They are apparently everywhere. A century ago, supererogation was neglected by leading lights like G.E. Moore (1903). Since then, philosophers have brought it out of the shadows. We now have two clear and illuminating definitions of supererogation. The first says that supererogatory acts are those that are permissible and incompatible with the moral
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Monash University, Wellington Rd, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia
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minimum.1 To call an act ‘‘permissible’’ is to say that it may be done, that it would not be wrong. The idea of a ‘‘moral minimum’’ may be left undefined, but it roughly means ‘‘doing the least good that one can permissibly do.’’ For example, keeping my spare kidney is part of the moral minimum that I could do right now; donating it is incompatible with keeping it; but it is also perfectly permissible to donate. By this first definition, the donation is therefore supererogatory. That is exactly the right result. The second definition says that a supererogatory act is permissible and yet better than a permissible alternative.2 Lo: giving the kidney is permissible and yet better than keeping it. Eventually we should clarify what we mean by ‘better’—nicer consequences, more praise due to the agent, more reason in favor of the act?—but whatever the details, this definition gets the kidney case right, too.3 Our two definitions thus coincide in our case of self-sacrifice. Same for normal cases of favors, forgiveness—indeed, any boring normal finite choice. But what about choices from infinite options? What if our options A, B, C, … form a cycle of betterness, where A [ B [ C [ … [ A? In such cases, I argue, not only do the definitions come apart: they are both unacceptable, though in different ways. One can handle only infinite cases; the other can handle only cycles. Assuming for now that we care about both cases, we face a dilemma. If we can’t solve it, supererogation may slink back into the shadows of indefinability. The official goal, then, is to find a more rigorous definition of supererogation. But en passant I hope to convince you of a methodological poi
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