Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution the a
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SERIES C: GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH VOLUME 34
Editor-in-Chief : H. Peters (Maastricht University, The Netherlands); Honorary Editor: S. H. Tijs (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). Editorial Board: E.E.C. van Damme (Tilburg University, The Netherlands); H. Keiding (University of Copenhagen, Denmark); J.-F. Mertens (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium); H. Moulin (Rice University, Houston, USA); Shigeo Muto (Tokyo University, Japan); T. Parthasarathy (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India); B. Peleg (Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel); T.E.S. Raghavan (University of Illinois at Chicago, USA); J. Rosenmüller (University of Bielefeld, Germany); A. Roth (Harvard University, USA); D. Schmeidler (Tel-Aviv University, Israel); R. Selten (University of Bonn, Germany); W. Thomson (University of Rochester, USA). Scope: Particular attention is paid in this series to game theory and operations research, their formal aspects and their applications to economic, political and social sciences as well as to sociobiology. It will encourage high standards in the application of game-theoretical methods to individual and social decision making.
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
Bezalel Peleg · Peter Sudhölter
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games Second Edition
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Professor Bezalel Peleg The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Institute of Mathematics and Center for the Study of Rationality Givat-Ram, Feldman Building 91904 Jerusalem Israel [email protected] Professor Peter Sudhölter University of Southern Denmark Department of Business and Economics Campusvej 55 5230 Odense M Denmark [email protected]
Library of Congress Control Number: 2007931451
ISSN 0924-6126 ISBN 978-3-540-72944-0 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York ISBN 978-1-4020-7410-3 1st Edition Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
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