Is higher-order evidence evidence?
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Is higher-order evidence evidence? Eyal Tal1
Accepted: 2 September 2020 Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question? When we gain information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational, we are in one of two general cases. In the first case we made no error, and our beliefs are rational. In that case the input to the contrary is misleading. In the second case we indeed believe irrationally, and our original evidence already requires us to fix our mistake. In that case the input to that effect is normatively superfluous. Thus, we know that information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational is either misleading or superfluous. This, I submit, renders the input incapable of justifying belief revision, despite our not knowing which of the two kinds it is. Keywords Disagreement Epistemic akrasia Higher-order evidence Steadfast
1 Introduction Some information that we come across seems to bear on whether we believe things rationally. For example, we might learn that we tend to discount evidence that we are bad drivers, or that we are hopeless at forming rational beliefs about probabilities. We might also learn that others agree or disagree with our assessment of the evidence, or that they take our evidence to justify some particular degree of belief. The information that we gain in these sorts of cases corresponds to what philosophers often call ‘higher-order evidence’ (hereafter, HOE). HOE is presented in the literature as evidence about the rationality of our beliefs, or evidence about & Eyal Tal [email protected] 1
Brandeis University, Waltham, USA
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E. Tal
what our evidence supports. For instance, Christensen (2010a) describes HOE as ‘‘evidence that the evidential relations may not be as I’ve taken them to be,’’ and Kelly (2010) understands HOE to be ‘‘evidence about the normative upshot of the evidence to which [one] has been exposed.’’ In what follows I argue that the information we receive in the kinds of examples above is irrelevant to what we should believe.1 I will refer to our evidential situation prior to receiving some HOE as our original evidence, or our other evidence. I will refer to the doxastic attitude whose rationality is in question as the lower-level belief. The discussion proceeds mainly in terms of a ternary model of belief, but is intended to apply equally well to a graded model. Thus, ‘belief’ will be used interchangeably with ‘doxastic attitude’ and with ‘credence.’ Given this terminology, the claim I defend is that we are rationally required to form our lower-level beliefs without regard for HOE.2 Throughout the paper I assume an evidentialist framework. On this framework, a belief is rational if and only if it accords with and is properly based on the agent’s total evidence. I also assume that rationality requires that we form the beliefs that our e
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