Is the All-Subjected Principle Extensionally Adequate?
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Is the All‑Subjected Principle Extensionally Adequate? Vuko Andrić1,2
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract This paper critiques the All-Subjected Principle. The All-Subjected Principle is one of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem, which consists in determining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. The AllSubjected Principle comes in many versions, but the general idea is that all people who are subjected in a relevant sense with regard to a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in that decision. One respect in which versions of the All-Subjected Principle differ concerns how to best understand ‘subjectedness’. One view spells out ‘subjectedness’ in terms of legal bindingness. Another view understands ‘subjectedness’ in terms of coercion. I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is extensionally inadequate on both views in that it yields verdicts that are at odds with our considered judgements about certain cases. These cases involve legal norms of referral or international administrative assistance. Keywords All-Subjected Principle · Boundary Problem · Legal bindingness · Coercion · Legal norms of referral · International administrative assistance This paper examines the All-Subjected Principle, which is one of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem. The Boundary Problem consists in determining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. According to the All-Subjected Principle, entitlements to participation in democratic decisions should depend on subjectedness. Many different versions of the All-Subjected Principle can be found in the literature on the Boundary Problem. The versions differ, among other things, in how they spell out ‘subjectedness’. One view focuses on legal bindingness, the other on coercion. In this paper, I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is extensionally inadequate on both views. An answer to the Boundary Problem is (fully) extensionally adequate if and only if the answer coheres with our considered judgements * Vuko Andrić Vuko.Andric@uni‑bayreuth.de 1
Institut für Philosophie, Universität Bayreuth, Universitätsstraße 30, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany
2
Institute for Futures Studies, Box 591, Stockholm 10131, Sweden
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regarding democratic inclusion (and exclusion) in particular cases, i.e. our considered judgements about who should (and who should not) be entitled to participate in the democratic decisions that feature in (real or hypothetical) cases. I present cases that attempt to show that democratic inclusion should neither depend on legal bindingness nor on coercion. In the first section, I introduce the Boundary Problem and the All-Subjected Principle. In the second section, I review the current debate about the extensional adequacy of the All-Subjected Principle and, in this context, defend the All-Subjected Principle against two objections that have been put forward in the literature. In the third section, I try to show, by presenting a kind of case th
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