Jason Hanna: In Our Best Interest: A Defense of Paternalism
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Jason Hanna: In Our Best Interest: A Defense of Paternalism Oxford University Press, New York, 2018, Xi + 271 pp Robert Noggle1 Accepted: 26 September 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
In this ambitious book, Jason Hanna defends two claims: “first, that sound paternalistic rationales provide valid reasons in favor of intervention, and, second, that when intervention would be in the target’s best interest, it is permissible unless it is ruled out in virtue of its effects on others” (p. 8). Hanna calls the union of these two claims “pro-paternalism.” Although this definition avoids certain difficulties in defining paternalistic actions and policies (pp. 21–24), it somewhat counter-intuitively counts as a pro-paternalist someone who believes that paternalistic interference would be justified if it were in the target’s best interests, but that such interference never actually is in the target’s best interest. Thus, arguments that “it is virtually never reasonable to believe that intervention in the self-regarding affairs of a (non-consenting) adult would be in his best interest,” would only show that “pro-paternalism, even if true, may be insignificant at the level of practice” (pp. 31–32). Chapter 2 considers two anti-paternalist arguments of just this sort—those of John Stuart Mill. The first is the “argument from misapplication,” which claims that allowing paternalistic interferences fails to make people better off, both because the individual is the best judge of her own interests, and because of the danger that permission to interfere in other people’s self-regarding choices will be misused (pp. 33–35). Hanna concedes that pro-paternalists should favor institutional constraints on interference to minimize the danger of misuse (p. 38). But he denies that such constraints should be absolute. Hanna notes that the anti-paternalist argument for such constraints is essentially a rule consequentialist argument. Hanna argues that, even if we accept rule consequentialism as a general ethical framework, there is reason to expect the optimal set of rules to include some that protect agents from their own imprudent decisions (p. 41). Moreover, Hanna argues that human susceptibility to cognitive biases, akrasia, and failure to predict how their preferences might change over time undermine Mill’s assumption that an agent’s choices are always the best indicators of her best interest (pp. 43–45). Turning to Mill’s “individuality * Robert Noggle [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI 48859, USA
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argument,” Hanna argues that, even if the value of individuality requires a person to make most choices for herself, it is implausible to think that it requires her to make every choice for herself, and this leaves room for individuality-preserving paternalistic interventions. Moreover, Hanna argues, paternalistic interventions can improve or protect our capacities for individuality, by preserving health, increa
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