Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression

  • PDF / 391,466 Bytes
  • 18 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
  • 108 Downloads / 260 Views

DOWNLOAD

REPORT


Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression Gehan Gunatilleke 1,2 Accepted: 26 October 2020/ # The Author(s) 2020

Abstract The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, ‘limit’ the freedom of expression on certain grounds, such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Examples from around the world show that the freedom of individuals to express their opinions, convictions, and beliefs is often imperilled when states are not required to meet a substantial justificatory burden when limiting such freedom. This article critiques one of the common justificatory approaches employed in a number of jurisdictions to frame the state’s burden to justify limitations on the freedom of expression—the proportionality test. It presents a case for an alternative approach that builds on the merits and addresses some of the weaknesses of a typical proportionality test. This alternative may be called a ‘duty-based’ justificatory approach because it requires the state to demonstrate—through the presentation of publicly justifiable reasons—that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from the expressive conduct in question. The article explains how this approach is more normatively compelling than a typical proportionality test. It also illustrates how such an approach can better constrain the state’s ability to advance majoritarian interests or offload its positive obligations by limiting the freedom of expression of minorities and dissenting voices. Keywords Freedom of expression . Liberty . Limitations on rights . Duties of justice . State authority . Justification . Public reason

Introduction The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, ‘limit’

* Gehan Gunatilleke [email protected]

1

Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, USA

2

University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

G. Gunatilleke

the freedom of expression for certain reasons. International and domestic law empowers the state to impose limitations on the freedom of expression in order to advance broad aims such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Yet cases from around the world demonstrate that the freedom of expression is vulnerable to unwarranted restrictions. One of the most common tests used to determine whether a limitation on the freedom of expression is justified has come to be known as the ‘proportionality test’. In this article, I critique the typical proportionality test that is applied in many jurisdictions. I then offer a justificatory approach that reframes this typical test to address some of its normative and practical weaknesses. This alternative approach places individual ‘duties of justice’ at the heart of the state’s burden to justify a limitation on the freedom of expression. The first section of this article discusses