Key Update Countermeasure for Correlation-Based Side-Channel Attacks
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Key Update Countermeasure for Correlation-Based Side-Channel Attacks Yutian Gui1 · Suyash Mohan Tamore1 · Ali Shuja Siddiqui1 · Fareena Saqib1 Received: 14 January 2020 / Accepted: 13 April 2020 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
Abstract Side-channel analysis is a non-invasive form of attack that reveals the secret key of the cryptographic circuit by analyzing the leaked physical information. The traditional brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks target the weakness in the encryption algorithm, whereas side-channel attacks use statistical models such as differential analysis and correlation analysis on the leaked information gained from the cryptographic device during the run-time. As a non-invasive and passive attack, the side-channel attack brings a lot of difficulties for detection and defense. In this work, we propose a key update scheme as a countermeasure for power and electromagnetic analysis-based attacks on the cryptographic device. The proposed countermeasure utilizes a secure coprocessor to provide secure key generation and storage in a trusted environment. The experimental results show that the proposed key update scheme can mitigate side-channel attacks significantly. Keywords Hardware security · Side-channel attack · Correlation power analysis · Electromagnetic analysis · Trusted Platform Module
1 Introduction The side-channel attacks can steal the secret key used in the encryption engine [1]. During execution, the leakage of physical information (a.k.a. side-channel) is inevitable and can be utilized to reveal the information based on the fundamental principle that there is a correlation between the side-channel leakage and the internal state of the processing device, which is related to the secret information. In contrast to invasive attacks which require direct access to the internal components in the chip, the side-channel attack exploits
Yutian Gui
external leaked information, such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and time delay. Besides, the sidechannel attack is passive which has become a critical threat to the security of cryptographic chips and devices. To mitigate the risk of side-channel attacks, countermeasures such as message hiding [2] and masking technique [3, 4] are presented in the literature. The objective of such techniques is to increase the time required to reveal the secret key thereby protect cryptographic implementations from different side-channel attacks. In this work, we propose a key update scheme with the integration of a secure coprocessor on the hardwarebased implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to increase the resilience to different side-channel attacks.
[email protected] Suyash Mohan Tamore [email protected] Ali Shuja Siddiqui [email protected] Fareena Saqib [email protected] 1
The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223, USA
Contributions This paper makes the following contributions: 1. We have applied the correlation power analysis (CPA) attack and the correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) attack
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