Knowledge, Perception and Memory

In this book I present what seem to me (at the moment) to be right an­ swers to some of the main philosophical questions about the topics men­ tioned in the title, and I argue for them where I can. I hope that what I say may be of interest both to those w

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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES IN PHILOSOPHY Editors: WILFRID SELLARS, KEITH LEHRER,

University of Pittsburgh University of Arizona

Board of Consulting Editors: JONATHAN BENNETT, ALAN GIBBARD,

University of British Columbia University of Pittsburgh

ROBERT STALNAKER, ROBER T G. TURNBULL,

Cornell University Ohio State University

VOLUME5

CARL GINET Cornell University

KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTION, AND MEMORY

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY DORDRECHT-HOLLAND / BOSTON-U.S.A.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Ginet, Carl, Knowledge, perception, and memory (philosophical studies series in philosophy ; 5) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Knowledge, Theory of. 2. Perception. 3. Memory. 1. Title. BD161.G54 121 75-8602 ISBN-13: 978-90-277-1191-5 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-9451-1 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-9451-1

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc. 306 Dartmouth Street, Boston, Mass. 02116, U.S.A.

All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1975 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1975 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface I. Introduction II. The General Conditions of Knowledge: Truth and Confidence

VI]

1 12

III. The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification

28

IV. The General Conditions of Knowledge: External Conclusiveness

67

V. Perceptual Facts VI. Perceptual Knowledge

82 117

VII. Memory Knowledge

14:

VIII. When and Why to Trust One's Senses and Memory

174

BIBLIOGRAPHY

20:

INDEX OF NAMES

208

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

210

PREFACE

In this book I present what seem to me (at the moment) to be right answers to some of the main philosophical questions about the topics mentioned in the title, and I argue for them where I can. I hope that what I say may be of interest both to those who have already studied these questions a lot and to those who haven't. There are several important topics in epistemology to which I give little or no attention here - such as the nature of a proposition, the major classifications of propositions (necessary and contingent, a priori and a posteriori, analytic and synthetic, general and particular), the nature of understanding a proposition, the nature of truth, the nature and justification of the various kinds of inference (deductive, inductive, and probably others) - but enough is covered, to one degree or another, that the book might be of use in a course in epistemology. Earlier versions of some of the material in Chapters II, III, and IV were some of the material in Ginet (1970). An earlier version of the part of Chapter VII on memory-connection was a paper that I profited from reading and discussing in philosophy discussion groups at Cornell University, SUNY at Albany, and Syracuse University in 1972-73. I do not like to admit how long I have been