Low-Cost and Strong-Security RFID Authentication Protocol
This paper proposes a low-cost and strong-security RFID protocol to reduce the computational load on both the back-end database and the tags in an RFID system. When desynchronization occurs as a result of a communication failure or malicious attack, the p
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Dept. of Information Security, Hoseo Univ., 336-795, Korea [email protected] 2 School of Electrical Eng. and Computer Science, Kyungpook National Univ., 702-701, Korea [email protected] Information Security Institute, Queensland Univ. of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD, 4001, Australia {juamma, boyd}@isrc.qut.edu.au
Abstract. This paper proposes a low-cost and strong-security RFID protocol to reduce the computational load on both the back-end database and the tags in an RFID system. When desynchronization occurs as a result of a communication failure or malicious attack, the proposed protocol can recover synchronization between the database and the tag in the following session. Furthermore, the proposed protocol also satisfies most security requirements, including the strong privacy property defined by Juels and Weis, plus robustness against replay and spoofing attacks and forward security. Keywords: RFID system, authentication, indistinguishability, traceability, strong-privacy.
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Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are expected to replace optical barcodes due to many important advantages, such as their low cost, small size, fast identification, and invisible implementation within objects. An RFID system consists of three parts: RFID tags, an RFID reader, and back-end database. Yet, since the RFID reader communicates with the tags using RF interfaces, this insecure channel leaves an RFID system vulnerable to various attacks, such as eavesdropping, spoofing, replay attacks, traceability, and message interrupt attacks. Although a lot of research has already focused on solving the security problems of RFID systems, some existing RFID protocols still suffer from various security weaknesses, including authentication, location privacy, and resynchronization between two entities. One solution to protect tags from these threats is secure authentication between the tag and the reader. However, due to tag’s computational power and
This research was supported by the MIC of Korea, under the ITRC support program supervised by the IITA(IITA-2007-C1090-0701-0026).
M. Denko et al. (Eds.): EUC Workshops 2007, LNCS 4809, pp. 795–807, 2007. c IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2007
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storage space, a low-cost authentication protocol is needed that takes account of the back-end server’s capacity and tag’s implementation limitations. Initial attempts to resolve the RFID authentication problem between the tag and the reader involved physical technologies and included the ‘Kill command’ [11], ‘Active jamming’ [5], and ‘Blocker tag’ [5] approaches. Thereafter, Weis et al. [9, 10, 11] proposed a hash-lock protocol and randomized hash-lock protocol as cryptographic solutions. However, in the randomized hash-lock protocol, the identity of a tag, IDk , is transmitted from the reader to the tag through an insecure channel in the final step of authentication, making it vulnerable to a replay attack, spoofing attack, and location tracing. Meanwhile, Henrici and M¨ uller
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